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ABSTRACT
The primary objective of this research is to explore the dynamics in the
development of civil conflict. Specifically, I attempt to explain the reasons for the
occurrence of full-scale internal armed conflicts and the variation in intensity of those
conflicts. Given that a substantial portion of previous studies in the field have taken
rebel-centric and aggregate cross-country approaches, this research focuses on the state
side and how the internal-external environments within which the ruling regime is
situated affect its security decisions on rebellion.
The main argument is that internal armed conflict is a serious security problem of
incumbent governments in the new states established in the twentieth century, and the
occurrence and intensification of conflict depends on how ruling governments respond to
rebellion. In the face of rebellion, a ruling regime has to decide whether to repress the
rebels or compromise with them, based on consideration of internal and external
dimensions of state security. That is, three dimensions of state security – domestic,
regional, and international – influence the ruling regime’s choice between repression and
compromise. This theoretical framework is called “the Three Dimensionality Model of
state security and armed conflict.” When the ruling regime enjoys consolidated power
status in domestic politics, is involved in intense rivalry relationship with a neighboring
state, and is highly dependent on a superpower country that supports military options, the
regime is more likely to repress a rebel group and thus the conflict is intensified.
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Using the method of controlled comparison, this research conducts a set of
comparative case studies to examine the theory. First, I compare the three different
phases of the Iraqi-Kurdish conflict: the 1961-1970 conflicts, the 1974-1975 conflict, and
the 1985-1988 conflicts. The three cases differ in terms of outcomes and severity of
conflicts. I analyze the domestic, regional, and international dimensions of the ruling
regime’s security considerations. The results show that when the power status of the
ruling regime is consolidated, the relationship with Iran was more hostile, and the ruling
regime relied less on superpowers, the regime did not accommodate the Kurdish rebels
and repressed them more severely, resulting in intense conflicts. Second, applying the
key findings from the Iraqi-Kurdish cases, I compare the 2011 Egyptian uprising and the
2011 Libyan civil conflict and analyze reasons for the divergent outcomes in the two
countries in the wake of the so-called Arab Spring. The results also confirm the theory.
The different internal-external circumstances in which the Mubarak and the Gaddafi
regimes were situated led them to make different decisions in the face of uprisings, which
resulted in a peaceful transfer of power in one country and a full-scale armed conflict in
the other.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Many parts of the globe have been suffering from severe internal armed conflicts.
The occurrence of armed conflict within a state has outnumbered conflict between states,
resulting in tens of thousands of casualties in the fighting each year, including innocent
civilians.1 The impact of civil conflict is not limited to a single state, however. Civil
conflict in one country is often followed by regional instability by inviting the
intervention from foreign states. A flow of refugees becomes a major problem in
neighboring countries, or beyond as in many European states where the influx of refugees
from the Middle East has caused serious social and political problems (Cockayne,
Mikulaschek, and Perry 2010). Recognizing the importance of the issue in maintaining
peace and security, the international community has been working to stop conflicts.
Understanding the dynamics of the development of civil conflict is foremost in the
world’s effort to bring about peace. This research is an attempt to be part of this global
endeavor.
The phenomenon of civil conflict is more prevalent in the new states that were
established in the twentieth century, particularly since World War II. These states have
suffered from persistent internal insecurity. Yet, it is interesting to observe that not all of
1

For instance, 400,000 Syrians have been killed and another 70,000 have perished due to a lack
of basics in five years of civil war (Reuters, February 11, 2016.
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-casualties-idUSKCN0VK0MQ (accessed
October 11, 2016).
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the new states have experienced full-scale domestic armed conflicts, and even if they
have, the severity and intensity of such conflicts varies. Why do we observe such
differences? What are the factors that led states to take different paths after independence,
and how did those factors play a role in bringing about violent conflict, and in making a
difference in the severity of civil conflict? These are the questions that this research
specifically asks.
While much of the contemporary literature on civil conflict in the field of
international relations focuses on a rebel side, the main interest of this research is the
government side. As definitions of civil conflict commonly demonstrate, at least one
party is a state or a representative of a state. For instance, Mason defines (2009, 68) civil
wars as “armed conflicts that take place within a nation that is a recognized member of
the nation-state system.” Similarly, Collier and Hoeffler (2002, 3) define civil war as “an
internal conflict with at least 1000 combat-related deaths, with both an identifiable rebel
organization and government forces suffering at least five percent of these casualties.”
These definitions indicate that although it is more likely that an organized non-state
group triggers conflict, the development of the armed conflict is a result of interaction
between a government and a rebel group. That is, a government’s set of decisions to deal
with rebellion are key to understanding armed internal/anti-government conflict.
This research argues that internal armed conflict is a serious security problem of
incumbent governments in the new states born in the twentieth century. In fact, the
concept of security was originally defined in terms of violent external threats and the
states’ response to these threats for the survival and integrity of the state. However,
armed conflict within the border often becomes a more serious threat in the new states.
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Policy decisions on internal armed conflict, therefore, should be understood as
governments’ security policy, and it is important to figure out the factors that influence
the governments’ decisions between suppression and accommodation.
The government of a state is set in a much more complex situation than the rebel
group. As a member of the nation- state system, its policy decisions are affected by both
domestic and international politics. This is especially true when the international status of
the state is weak, so the state is more susceptible to external influences. Neither its
foreign policy nor internal policy is free from external influences. Armed conflict, in
particular, requires both sides to secure an enormous amount of resources, which often
invites the involvement and intervention of other countries. During the Cold War, the
United States and the Soviet Union formed alliances with new states by providing
massive economic and military aid. Aid became a political leverage to force the recipient
states to follow the superpower’s stance. After the Soviet Union collapsed, the United
States filled the power vacuum and expanded its influence. Regional politics also matters.
When states compete for regional power status, domestic turmoil in rival states creates
the opportunity to take advantage and solidify its regional power status. Governments can
destabilize rival states further by assisting rebel forces, making a conflict longer and more
intense. In this sense, internal armed conflict in the new states becomes a serious security
problem to incumbent governments. The decisions regarding rebellion are influenced by
not only political situations within the state border, but also by the external environment
of the state. Thus, it is necessary to consider both internal and external factors when one
studies the dynamics of the development of civil conflict. This research focuses on three
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dimensions of state security – domestic, regional, and international dimensions – which I
call “the Three Dimensionality Model of state security.”
This dissertation is a first attempt at presenting and doing research to evaluate the
utility of the Three Dimensionality Model. To deal with what could be a quite complex
model, with many conditions and variables, this first take will hold a number of
conditions and variables constant. To make the investigation of this more complex
version of the model more tractable, future development and evaluation of the model – as
will be discussed in the last chapter – will involve adding more factors, more complicated
typology, a broader set of cases, and utilizing other types of analyses.2
The following chapters consist of the review of the literature, the theoretical
framework, empirical case studies, and a conclusion. In chapter two, I review the
existing studies on civil conflict in the field of international relations. The literature is
classified according to its main argument and focus. One group of researchers advocates
that the relative deprivation of discriminated groups is a main reason of rebellion. In
1993, Gurr and his colleagues constructed the first a data set on politically mobilized
communal groups and conducted a serious of large-N analysis of civil conflict. Their
attempt was followed by the empirical studies that focus on the grievances of minority
groups and the role of grievance in conflict onset and process. Doubts about the
“grievance” argument, however, have led another group of researchers to focus on the
influence of structural factors of the state. They emphasize states’ economic and political
structures, such as the level of economic and democratic development, and the ethnic
component of population. Lastly, horizontal inequality theorists content that “grievance”
still matters. Constructing a new data set on all politically relevant ethnic groups and their
2

Discussion on future developments will be fully developed in the concluding chapter.
4

access to state power in every country, this group of researchers argues that inequalities
in access to the central authority among politically relevant ethnic groups and the struggle
for state power are the main reasons for civil conflict. From the review of the literature, I
outline the limitations of the rebel-centric and the aggregate cross-country approaches in
the existing studies.
In chapter three, I construct a theoretical framework for this research – a model of
the three dimensions of state security and armed conflict. I define the concept of security,
arguing for the usefulness of the concept and the need for considering the
multidimensional nature of security in studying internal armed conflict in new states. I
point out that while the colonial experience and military capabilities of the state brings
the “opportunity” for internal instability to the new states, governments make security
decisions to deal with rebellion based on their domestic, regional, and international
environments. That is, the choice between suppression and compromise is a result of the
consideration of these three dimensions of the state security situation.
Chapter four introduces the analysis of comparative case studies. I provide a
justification of using the method of “controlled comparison” as the main analytical tool
of this research, along with the study’s research design. I particularly emphasize the
reasons why I choose the cases of the Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts and the two mass uprisings
during the 2011 Arab Spring – the Egyptian uprising and the Libyan civil conflict.
Chapter five contains the main empirical studies of this research – the IraqiKurdish conflicts. The chapter presents the impact of British rule on the emergence of the
Iraqi Kurdish movements and military capabilities of the Iraqi government as an
opportunity of armed conflict. Pointing out differences in the onset of conflicts and the
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extent, severity, and intensity of each case, I compare the three different time phases of
the Iraqi-Kurdish conflict: The 1961-1970 conflicts, the 1974-1975 conflict, and the
1985-1988 conflicts. I analyze the three cases on the basis of domestic, regional, and
international dimensions of the ruling regime’s security consideration. Then, I find how
different internal and external circumstances in each phase brought about contrasting
results in terms of the severity and the outcomes.
In chapter six, in order to make analytic generalizations, I conduct another set of
comparative case studies, applying key findings from the Iraqi-Kurdish cases to the 2011
Egyptian uprising and the 2011 Libyan civil war. Although the two countries share a
number of commonalities, the ruling regimes reacted differently when mass
demonstrations erupted in 2011. While the Mubarak regime made concessions several
times to ease the anger of demonstrators in streets, the Gaddafi regime almost
immediately used force to repress protesters. These differences in governments’ response
brought about contrasting outcomes to the two states. I analyze and compare differences
in domestic, regional, and international dimensions of the two states’ security and how
each dimension affected the regimes’ decision on the uprising. Lastly, in chapter seven, I
conclude with the findings and results, the implications of the results and contributions of
this research, and the suggestions for future study.

6

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Constructing cross-country data sets, international relations (IR) scholars have
brought a new trend of research to the field of civil conflict studies. Research is not
limited to a single or small number of case studies. Instead, the research is often global in
scope. This broadened scope of research enables researchers to generate more
generalizable theories of civil conflict. In this chapter, I review the literature on civil
conflict onset and severity in the field of IR and describe how the discussion has evolved.
Also, I point out the limitations of previous studies and how the present research can
contribute to our understanding of civil conflict.
2.1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LITERATURE ON CIVIL CONFLICT ONSET AND SEVERITY
2.1.1 Relative Deprivation Theories with a Large-Scale Data Sets
Gurr (1993) attempted the first large-N analysis of communal conflict by building
a data set on politically mobilized communal groups throughout the world. The
Minorities at Risk (MAR) data set tracks 283 politically-active ethnic groups throughout
the world from 1975, focusing on ethnopolitical groups, or non-state communal groups3

3

Communal groups are defined as “those whose core members share a distinctive and persistent
collective identity based on cultural and ascriptive traits that are important to them and to others
with whom they interact” (Gurr 1993, 163).
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that have “political significance” and who are selected based on the two following
criteria: (1) The group collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory
treatment vis-à-vis other groups in a society; (2) The group is the basis for political
mobilization and collective action in defense or promotion of its self-defined interests.4
Based on his relative deprivation theory and the new data set, Gurr studies ethnic
minorities’ reactions to state-imposed discrimination, and presents the conditions under
which mobilization of minorities turn violent (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Gurr
1993). He tries to make generalizable explanations for how minority groups who suffer
from economic, political, and cultural discrimination could trigger protests and rebellions
against the state.
The MAR dataset has allowed scholars to expand the scope of their research,
move into new areas of research, and undertake a diverse set of quantitative studies of
ethnic violence. Scholars have studied various subjects in ethnic conflict, including the
relationship between a domestic environment of inequality with regard to ethnic
minorities and the likelihood that a state will use violence internationally (Caprioli and
Trumbore, 2013); how problematic domestic circumstances lead a country’s leaders to
divert population discontent by launching military campaigns against ethnic minorities
(Tir and Jasinski, 2008); the ethnoreligious minorities and the role of religion in civil
conflict (Fox 2003; 2004); and the disparities in external support for ethnic groups in
international relations (Saideman 2002).
Although the MAR data set allows scholars of civil conflict to broaden the scope
of their studies enormously, it is often criticized for selection problems. Considering
disadvantaged groups only results in sampling bias. This makes it difficult to detect the
4

http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/about.asp (accessed October 11, 2016).
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systematic relationship between discrimination and rebellion (Fearon 2002, 3). In
addition, as Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009) point out, those studies do not take into
account countries where a minority ethnic group rules the state or countries with complex
ethnic coalitions. These limitations have led scholars to doubt grievance theories of civil
conflict and have motivated them to develop new data to better conceptualize and
measure the ethnic diversity of states.
2.1.2 Research That Emphasizes Structural Factors
In contrast to the “grievance” tradition, some scholars contend that ethnic
diversity or grievances along with ethnic groups is not a fundamental reason for rebellion,
emphasizing the influence of structural factors of the state.5 Economic models of civil
war onset and duration show that economic factors, such as a weak economic foundation
of the state or economic incentives to rebel, are more directly associated with a higher
likelihood of the outbreak of civil war than ethnic identity. These studies regard
economic inequality as a main source of conflict and conflict escalation, arguing that low
GDP per capita is a strong predictor of civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Lacina 2006).
Economic-centered studies show that weak economies perpetuate socio-economic
inequalities and discrimination, and create conflictual circumstances. Specifically, using a
low per capita income as a proxy for state capacity, Fearon and Laitin (2003, 75) argue

5

The extent of ethnic diversity of the state and its relationship with conflict are tested with a
quantitative measurement. The most commonly used measure of aggregate ethnic diversity is the
Ethnolingustic Fractionalization (ELF) index, which is defined as “the probability that two
randomly selected individuals in a country are from different ethnolinguistic groups (Fearon and
Laitin 2003; Fearon 2002, 18). It implies that the higher a nation’s ELF score, the more
fragmented the nation is (Mason 2009, 92). Researchers in this tradition include the ELF index in
their empirical models as one of many independent variables to determine if there is a statistical
relationship between the extent of ethnic fractionalization of a state and the probability of the
outbreak of civil conflict.
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that financially, organizationally, and politically weak central governments render
insurgency more feasible due to inept policing and corrupt counterinsurgency practices.
They insist that conventional beliefs about the influence of ethnic diversity on internal
violence are not supported. In their study of economic conditions and the intensity of
conflict, Chaudoin, Peskowitz, and Stantou (2015) find that the intensity of conflict is
negatively related to GDP per capita. They argue that conflicts in economically poorer
countries are more likely to be longer and more severe. Similarly, Collier, Hoeffler, and
Söderbom (2004) find that low per capita income and high inequality lengthen conflict.
In the same vein, Collier and Hoeffler (2000) advocate the “greed” model of
rebellion in contrast with grievance-based theories. Assuming that both “greed” and
“grievance” can be reasons for uprising, they test two models of rebellion and find that
civil war initiation depends more on the natural resource endowment and the opportunity
cost of rebellion rather than on the unfair distribution of wealth. These two seminal
empirical studies of civil war commonly argue that inequality in individual wealth
distribution, which represents grievance, has no statistically significant affect on the
likelihood of civil war onset (Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011).
The other portion of civil conflict studies has turned its attention to the influence
of regime type or the level of democratic development, and examined how democratic
development or the stability of political regimes relates to domestic conflict. Many
studies find that harsh coercive states and strong democracies experience fewer and
shorter civil wars than intermediate regimes that score in the middle range on the
democracy-autocracy index (Benson and Kugler 1998; Goldston, Bates, Gurr, Lustik,
Marxhall, Ulfelder, and Woodward 2005; Gurr, Woodward, and Marshall 2005; Hegre,
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Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch 2001; Muller and Weede 1990). Because intermediate
regimes lack both democratic mechanisms to solve the problem and sufficient coercive
power to suppress people with grievances, there exists a statistically significant higher
probability of violence in intermediate regimes than in either democracies or autocracies.6
2.1.3 Horizontal Inequalities (HIs) Theories
One group of scholars disagreed with the cross-national research based on
structural factors, arguing that the rejection of grievances and inequalities is premature
(Roessler 2010; Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011). Based on Stewart’s (2008)
notion of “horizontal inequalities (HIs),” scholars in this stream of research show that a
disparity in the distribution of state power between ethnic groups promotes ethnic civil
conflict. Horizontal inequalities are “inequalities between culturally defined groups or
groups with shared identities” as opposed to vertical inequalities (VIs), which refer to
inequalities among individuals, (Stewart 2008, 12).
Building on Stewart’s theoretical model on HIs, Wimmer, Cederman, and Min
(2009) constructed a new data set of politically relevant ethnic groups and their political
status – The Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset. The latest version identifies all
politically relevant ethnic groups and their access to state power in every country of the
world from 1946 to 2010. 758 groups are included along with the degree to which their

6

Another major part of academic literature comprises studies that focus on geographic factors
(Ragan 1996; Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Buhaug, Gates, and Jufala 2009; Cederman,
Buhaug, and Rød 2009) and those that examine the effect of third party intervention (BalchLindsay and Enterline 2000; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Dorussen, 2007).
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representatives held executive-level state power – from total control of the government to
overt political discrimination.7
The central theme of HIs theories in IR is that civil conflict is the result of ethnic
exclusion from state power and competition over control of the central government. That
is, inequalities in access to the central authority among politically relevant ethnic groups
and struggle over state power are the main reasons for ethnic conflict. Scholars in this
stream challenge the notion that the grievances of ethnic groups are irrelevant in the
outbreak of civil conflict (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Cederman, Wimmer,
and Min 2010; Cederamn, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011).
The literature on HIs remedies some of shortcomings found in the early literature
of relative deprivation theories. Scholars of HIs reveal how ethnic group dynamics in the
center of state power can trigger internal violence. In addition, by including all politically
relevant ethnic groups in their data set to supplement the MAR data set, their studies also
show that not only minority ethnic groups, but also majority ethnic groups, including
groups in power, can instigate conflict (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009).
2.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE REBEL-CENTRIC AND THE AGGREGATE CROSS-COUNTRY
APPROACHES
By reviewing the existing research, I find two tendencies in studies of civil
conflict in the field of IR. First, a significant portion of the literature mainly focuses on
the rebel side. These studies emphasize the influence of economic and political inequality
on motivations of discriminated groups to rebel. While this rebel-centric approach has
revealed the determinants that influence the initial stages of conflict onset, it overlooks
7

http://www.epr.ucla.edu/ (accessed October 11, 2016).
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the active role that the state government plays in the course of conflict. It assumes that
the state is merely a “place” in which conflict takes place, or a neutral actor. This
assumption misses a simple but important point: conflict is an interaction between at least
two groups, and the state is an active participant against rebel groups (Saideman 1998;
Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010). In other words,
this approach disregards the fact that the active interaction between the rebels and the
government ultimately determines the intensity and the course of events in a conflict
(DeRouen and Sobek 2004).
The second tendency is the aggregate cross-country approach. This approach
considers the state as a whole, focusing on state attributes and structural factors such as
the level of economic development, national recourses, state capacity, and regime type
(Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009). While the state’s attributes are important
conditional factors for internal instability, this aggregate approach cannot reveal details of
how those characteristics of the state contributes to conflict outbreak and development.
Assuming that the state is a unitary actor, this approach misses the dynamics in states’
politics. Relying on simple indicators of states’ economy, capabilities, or government
characteristics can only give superficial understanding on the phenomenon.
There are some studies that try to overcome these limitations by focusing on the
state and specifying the characteristics of government. For example, Fjelde and Soysa
(2009) argue for the need to specify state capacity. They provide three different notions
of state capacity as a determinant of civil conflict and peace – coercion, co-option, and
cooperation. States’ coercive capacities are examined by the government’s ability to
extract large amounts of taxes. Co-optation means the level of public goods provision.

13

Cooperative capacities are assessed by the degree of trust of economic agents in state
institutions (Fjelde and Soysa 2009, 6). Their study finds that high level of government
spending on public goods and trustworthy institutions are more positively related to civil
peace than coercive capabilities. Hegre and Nygård (2014) explain why deprivationmotivated armed conflicts are less likely in democratic regimes by conceptualizing the
concept of “good governance.” They specify the concept with seven aspects –
bureaucratic quality, the rule of law, corruption, economic policies, military involvement
in politics, political exclusion and repression, and formal political institutions – and show
that the risk of conflict is diminished in countries characterized by good governance.
Although these studies elaborate more the relationship between states’ attributes
and civil conflicts, they still do not fully explain the motivations or reasons for states’
actions in the course of conflict. As I mentioned, conflict is a result of interaction
between a government and a rebel group. Therefore, the governments’ decision in dealing
with internal insurgency is another key factor that heavily influences the development of
conflict. Particularly, the extent of conflict intensity is highly related to how the state
responds to rebellion because governments possess stronger and more sustainable
military capacity than rebel groups in most cases.
Decision-making is a complex process. Decisions are made based on not only the
government’s ability to cope with internal opposition groups but also the internal and
external circumstances in which the state is situated. This is the case more for the Third
World countries since they are more susceptible to both domestic and international
environments. This research points out the need to include such complexity when we
study civil conflict. Therefore, I move beyond the rebel-centric and the aggregate state
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attributes approaches. I argue that governments’ decisions in the face of conflict is a
crucial determinant of civil conflict onset and intensification, and that the government
makes a decision based on the consideration of internal and external environments as
well as its capabilities. In the following chapter, I construct my analytic framework.
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CHAPTER 3
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The overarching analytical framework of this research is based on Most and Starr
(1989)’s “the logic of opportunity and willingness.” The logic suggests that conflict
possibly occurs when participating parties have both the opportunity and willingness to
fight against each other. Focusing on a government side, this research attempts to
examine how the government’s opportunities – capabilities and environmental factors –
affect its willingness to repress internal challenges and increase the risk of an armed
conflict. While the logic of opportunity and willingness is the overarching analytical
framework of this research, the concept of security is a substantive analytical tool to
study the issue systematically. Arguing that the likelihood and the intensity of armed
conflict depend on how the state reacts to internal challenges and that a state’s decision to
suppress the internal insurgency and launch military operations is the state’s security
policy decisions, this research emphasizes the internal and external dimensions of state
security are the primary factors that affect its policy choice on military operations.
In the following sections, I first introduce the logic of opportunity and
willingness. Second, I present the usefulness of the concept of security in civil conflict
studies and define the key concept – security and civil conflict. Third, emphasizing the
importance of historical factors in creating opportunities, I present how the periods of
colonial rule and decolonization have created opportunities for instability in the new
states forged in the twentieth century. Fourth, I present the role of military capabilities of
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states in creating opportunity to suppress, which increase the possibility of conflict onset.
Lastly, I explore the Three Dimensionality Model of state security concerns – domestic,
regional, and international – and how it influences the government’s decision on military
operations, which can bring about full-scale warfare between the government and a rebel
group.
3.1. THE LOGIC OF OPPORTUNITY AND WILLINGNESS
Logical thinking is crucial to all research. It helps us to understand what to study,
where we wish to go, and how we will get there to solve a “puzzle” (Most and Starr
1989). Logic provides researchers a clue of how to explain the phenomena of the world
and which theory and methodology to use to help their explanation. One of the puzzles
related to civil conflict is that there is a wide divergence between the paths new countries
take after independence. Most of the newly-formed states of the twentieth century
suffered from persistent internal insecurity after decolonization. Yet, not all the
postcolonial states have experienced full-scale domestic armed conflicts, and even if they
have, the severity and the intensity of conflicts vary. Why do we observe such
differences? What are the factors that forced the state to take different paths after
independence, and how did those factors interact with each other, bringing about violent
conflict? I believe that the logic of opportunity and willingness can help solve this puzzle.
The components of the outcomes are results of a choice process within actors and
interdependent interactions between actors. These choice processes are determined by the
“opportunity” and “willingness” of actors (Most and Starr 1989). Opportunity is the
possibility of interaction between parties so that it is possible for political events – armed
conflicts in this research – to arise (Most and Starr 1989, 30). Following Sprout and
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Sprout (1956, 1969)’s discussion on the relationships between the entity and
environment, Most and Starr explain the two dimensions of opportunity: (1) the actual
possibilities in the “objective” environment that creates and constrains the behavior of
humans, and (2) the capabilities that permit the creation of opportunity. The environment
in this research refers to the domestic and international environments in which the state
and the insurgent groups are situated. I further argue that political events in the course of
human history create new opportunities for participants by combining with the existing
opportunities. Capabilities refer to the ability of parties to fight in a conflict. In this
research, it mainly means military capabilities. Willingness, on the other hand, refers to
“the choice (and process of choice) that is related to the selection of some behavioral
options from a range of alternatives” (Most and Starr 1989, 23). This is related to the
decision makers’ calculation of advantage and disadvantage, which result from the
choices they make.
These two pillars of opportunity and willingness are jointly necessary conditions
for any political events, such as conflict, to occur. That is, a political phenomenon we
observe is the result of interactions between actors who are constrained by the
environment surrounding them and their capabilities to act. This logic of opportunity and
willingness enables researchers to conduct cross-level analysis that helps explain how
environmental factors affect an actor’s behavior, and in turn, how actors’ decisions shape
their future environment. Although Most and Starr (1989) use interstate war and the
foreign policy-making process to explain the logic of opportunity and willingness,8 I

8

Following Most and Starr (1989), Starr and his colleagues have shown how the logic of
opportunity and willingness can be applied to intra-state conflict and the synthesizing capabilities
of the framework. In his article on linkage between revolution and war, Starr (1994) pursues the
use of a common logic for both domestic conflict (revolution) and international conflict (war). To
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insist that this can also be utilized as a logical framework for analyzing intrastate conflict.
It is because civil conflict is a result of participants’ decision to fight, which is made
based on their capabilities and the political environment surrounding them.9
3.2 CIVIL CONFLICT STUDIES AND THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY
While the logic of opportunity and willingness provides the overarching analytical
framework, the concept of security offers a substantive analytical tool for this research to
study the issue systematically. Although the state usually has the upper hand in military
capabilities compared to the opposition groups, it is set in a more complex situation. As a
political entity that plays in multiple levels of domestic and international politics, the
state has to take into account not only internal aspects, but also external circumstances
when making a policy decision. Especially, because the newly established states are
highly susceptible to regional and international environments, domestic affairs often
invite external intervention and are often internationalized. Due to this susceptibility and
permeability of these states, decision makers always have to consider any possible
consequences of their decision. The external dimension of domestic issues and an
internal-external linkage becomes magnified when the issue involves military operation.
Applying the concept of security and security policy to the analysis of armed conflict in
the postcolonial states is useful in a sense that internal threats and its multidimensionality
are a major issue contributing to security problems of these states.

do so, he demonstrates analogies between revolution and war and finds commonalities in forms,
components and processes, and sources of conflict. Similarly, Simon and Starr (1996) model the
common logic of social conflict to explain internal and external security and state survival.
9
In the similar vein, Gleditsch, Hegre, and Strand (2009) conceptualize civil war as a product of
motive and opportunity in their studies of democracy and civil war.

19

The opportunity and willingness of the state is in many ways closely related to its
security and policies regarding military operations. The domestic and international
environment in which the state is situated can be related to different dimensions of state’s
security concerns. As the environmental aspect of opportunity creates and constrains the
behavior of the state, so do the different dimensions of security concerns. The capability
aspect of opportunity is the same as the ability of the state to secure the incumbent regime
from internal threats. The willingness of the state to repress its opposition can be
interpreted as being similar to the state’s security policy decision regarding the use of
military operations to deal with internal threats. Thus, if the opportunity and willingness
framework provides a comprehensive perspective, the concept of security provides a tool
to analyze the issue substantively. Both features of comprehensiveness and substantiality
are necessary for conducting research on a complex social phenomenon and achieving a
better understanding of the issue.
3.3 DEFINITIONS OF THE KEY CONCEPTS: SECURITY AND CIVIL CONFLICT
Thinking of civil conflict as a security problem for the states born in the twentieth
century is not a new concept. Security studies in the late 1980s and early 1990s criticized
the traditional concept of security based on the realist school because it overlooked
complex security problems the Third World states faced, focusing only on the
international aspect. New groups of scholars emphasized the importance of the domestic
dimension of security, such as the legitimacy problems of a given regime in power and its
relations with internal and external conflicts. For them, internal threats are as important
as external threats, and thus security policies of these states must have involved in
domestic considerations as well as their relationships with external considerations.
20

Despite their similarity and connectedness, it is surprising to find a disconnection
between security studies and civil conflict studies in the field of IR. I believe that
building a bridge between the two sub-fields will generate more comprehensive insights
into the states’ decisions in facing internal turmoil.
Despite its heavy presence in the literature, security is still a contested and
underdeveloped concept that has a relatively short history (Buzan 1991; Thomas 1992).
The concept was originally defined in terms of violent external threats and the states’
response to these threats (Azar and Moon 1988). In response to the devastating World
Wars, policy makers in the Western states made an effort to think of international politics
more systematically and find ways to protect their country from threats. This traditional
concept of security is based on a realist perception of international relations (Thomas
1992). The realist paradigm assumes that a state is a unitary and rational actor who plays
a principal role in the anarchic international environment. Because it is a unitary actor,
the internal dynamics of the state are not considered. As a rational actor, the state pursues
uncontestable national interests and values. Relationships with other states are established
based only on their interests. Therefore, the territorial integrity and political
independence (sovereignty) of the state and the physical protection of the population
from external adversaries are the most important values that should be preserved
(Alagappa 1987).
Although there has been no clear agreement on how to define the concept of
security, there are some common features that are included in the attempts to define it:
the freedom from threats and the protection of a state’s core values.10 In this research, I
define security as “the ability or effort of the state to preserve and protect core values
10

For the list of the definitions from previous studies, see Buzan 1991, 17-18.
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from threats.” The controversy over the interpretation of the concept arises from the
“relative nature of threats and core values”. That is, the nature of threats and core values
are relative in that they vary from state to state, across issue areas, and over time (Azar
and Moon 988, 2). Consequently, the concept of security can be interpreted differently
depending on how the threats and values are identified and perceived by policy makers.11
Applying the traditional realist approach to the non-Western countries, especially
the postcolonial states, is problematic in this sense. Distinctive historical experiences plus
the domestic and international situations surrounding these countries have brought about
a much more complex nature of threats to the incumbent regime and different priorities in
core values (Azar and Moon 1988). Accordingly, analyzing the security problems and
policies of newly born states based on the Western perspectives provides us only
fragmentary knowledge. Threats cannot be defined only externally in these countries. In
fact, internal insurgencies and rebellion are perhaps the most serious security threats that
the new states often face because it can directly jeopardize the incumbent’s survival. Not
only is the range of threats diverse, they are also multi-dimensional and highly
interconnected with each other. Because domestic politics are highly susceptible to
international politics, ruling regime’s decision on domestic issues, including the
insurgencies, cannot be free from the pressure for intervention from foreign powers who
seek to take advantage of other states’ domestic instability. The multidimensionality of
11

However, it does not mean that it is inherently inapplicable to the studies of state’s behavior. A
group of states share common features and similar experiences that are crucial to their security.
Most Western European countries share, for example, a period of an absolute monarchy and a
process of nation-state building. Many of the Third World states share the experience of
colonialism and political instability after the independence. These shared history and experience
make it possible to have similar patterns in their security problems and security policy decisions.
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the domestic affairs of the new states born in twentieth century is the reason why we need
to have an alternative approach to security, especially when we are interested in the
state’s behavior. In terms of core values, the ruling regime in new states tends to
prioritize regime security. The most important value to protect is regime survival rather
than a state’s overall well-being. Even if the regime insists on the protection of national
values and make policy decisions in the name of national security, security decision are
directly and indirectly designed to keep the regime in power (Alagappa 1987).
These differences in the meaning of security between Western countries and the
new states require us to approach security issues of the latter states with a more
comprehensive perspective. We need to understand that internal instability is a major
security concern of the incumbent regime, and its multidimensionality further
complicates the issue. In order to keep its power, the regime has to consider all of these
aspects when making a decision. As a major security issue, civil conflict can be regarded
as “an outcome of the state’s decision to eliminate or reduce insecurity of the incumbent
regime by repressing internal challenges and launching military operations against them.”
The regime makes a decision based on the degree of interconnectedness between internal
and external dimensions of the issue.
3.4 HISTORY AS A CREATOR OF OPPORTUNITY: THE INFLUENCE OF COLONIZATION AND
DECOLONIZATION AND SETTINGS FOR INSTABILITY
There is no doubt that history matters. An event that occurred in the past has
influenced the present and an event occurring in the present will affect the future. Yet not
everything has been influential on the present. Some events have had a greater impact
than others (Harkness 2012). Colonization is such an event.
23

Colonial rule has had a profound impact on the fate of new states of the twentieth
century by interfering with the gradual process of nation state building. The most crucial
legacies of colonial rule are arbitrarily defined territories and populations. Colonial
powers drew the lines of boundaries and divided the states based on their political and
economic interests, not considering historic and ethnic divisions of the region. As a
result, the region consisted of states that are artificial constructs of imperialism and
colonialism and far from a natural product of human history. The artificiality of the
postcolonial states has created opportunities for internal and external instability of the
state in two ways: (1) It has resulted in the crisis of legitimacy of the ruling regime; and
(2) It has created military capabilities by introducing the colonies to the modern military
system and giving the indigenous people a “chance” to experience modern warfare
through militarized anti-colonial movements.
Legitimacy is acceptance by people of the need to bring their behavior into line
with the dictates of an external authority (Tyler 1990, 25). This should come from the
moral grounds and principles on which power is based and/or the extent to which
government satisfies the expectation of the people. If a government has a weak moral
basis and fails to satisfy the people, hostility toward government will grow. Therefore,
the lack of legitimacy of the ruling regime is at the core of rebellion.
Legitimacy of a central government cannot be discussed without referring to the
development of the modern state. The state is the possessor of sovereignty over a given
territory that emerged as a specific type of political entity in the modern era (Breuilly
1994, 369; Tivey 1981; Maybury-Lewis 2002). It is sovereign in a sense that it possesses
indivisible authority to assert ultimate claims over the people within a consolidated
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territory, and that, at the same time, it is recognized as autonomous and integral by the
other states (Finer 1975). In order to maintain and exercise its sovereignty against internal
and external threats, the state has developed an institutional structure, which delimits and
justifies the claims attached to sovereignty (Breuilly 1994, 369). Therefore, if one’s statebuilding was successful, there should be only a single centralized governing regime
within the territory that controls its citizens so that, as a legal institution, only the state
has legitimate authority to bind people by law and confer on them uniform rights and
obligations (Smith 1986).
Securing legitimacy is crucial for the government since legitimacy is not only the
foundation of governmental power, but also a source of public support. In fact, legitimacy
of the state comes from a subjective judgment of members of the state. That is, to be
legitimate, state actions should be perceived by the people as “just” or “reasonable”
(Goldstone 2008, 285). Therefore, the extent of legitimacy of the state depends on how
much governments enjoy public loyalty and support for government legislation and
policies, along with international recognition of that support (Carment, Samy, and Prest
2008, 350). When a government is able to generate compliance from the population
without the threat of coercion (that is, generate legitimacy), it can then function
effectively (Jackman 1993, 36; Russett, Starr, and Kinsella 2009, 456). These processes
should occur over a long period of time so that the state is able to gradually solve the
problem of legitimacy.
State building in Western European countries in the modern era can be simplified
as this long process of entrenchment and penetration of statist institutions, and
monopolizing and concentrating the means of coercion in a given territory (Enloe 1980).
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This was the process by which the apparatus of governance had been made more formally
autonomous, differentiated from non-governmental organizations; more centralized; more
internally coordinated; and more able to penetrate various geographic and functional
sectors of society (Enloe 1980, 157-158). It was also accompanied by the peoples’
acknowledgment of the state’s legitimacy. As Tilly (1975) and Breuilly (1994) explain, in
Europe too, the process involved strong resistance from existing authorities and the
elimination of those rivals of the state. Also, the question of legitimacy of the state
became a serious issue. Yet, over hundreds of years since the Treaty of Westphalia, most
Western European states have solved the problem of legitimacy through deliberate efforts
to homogenize their populations to construct a national identity12, and finally achieve sole
authority over the populations within their territories.13 That is, the idea of the sovereign
state in Western Europe emerged gradually through a process of negotiation (Breuilly
1994, 373). In this sense, the ruling regime of the states in which this long process of
negotiation is absent or failed would suffer from a lack of legitimacy, and jurisdiction
over a population and a territory would not be universal (Perlmutter 1977). Accordingly,
state-makers in such countries would face a fierce resistance from sub-authorities.
Colonialism interfered with this gradual process of negotiation and development of
nation-state building. The disharmony between a state and nation caused by artificial
construction of the state is a common feature of postcolonial states. It has become a major
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Smith (1986) and Tilly (1975) argue that the state played a central role as the active principle of
cultural change in Western European countries. State-makers deliberately attempted to
homogenize the culture of the population through linguistic, religious, and educational
standardization. Smith introduces it as the cultural and educational revolution in Western Europe.
He also argues that the growth of mass conscription further facilitated the homogenization.
13
Here, I am not arguing that all countries on the globe should follow same path with Western
countries. I am arguing that applying western formulas to the states where different culture,
economy, and politics had been accumulated led to dysfunction in those states.
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source of the legitimacy crisis of these countries, and created an environment conductive
to internal instability of the country.
Colonialism “positively” influenced the creation of military capabilities as well.
Although limited, colonial powers had developed modern military forces in the colonized
country to keep statewide and regional order. Military officers were occasionally sent to
military academies abroad to learn the modern military system, and soldiers were trained
with modern armaments. When colonial powers left the country, the ruling regime
generally inherited the colonial army and made it as national military forces. Although
the regime had to redesign the national military, they at least had the basis of modern
military structure and the knowledge of how it works.
Another factor that influenced the creation of military capabilities is armed
struggle against colonial powers. In many countries, various types of anti-colonial
struggles emerged, including armed struggle. Armed struggle against a common enemy
gave the indigenous groups the chance to experience modern warfare with modern
equipment. The inevitable consequence of anti-colonial warfare was the militarization of
indigenous groups. When colonial powers ceded control of the former colonial territory
to indigenous groups, it became problematic for the state that multiple military forces in a
given territory existed. That is, the state did not have monopoly of the means of coercion
– the armed forces – and inherited more than one force within their territory (Horowitz
1986).14
In the period of decolonization, the military divided between ex-colonial forces
and anti-colonial forces, or between different units of the anti-colonial forces. Many of
14

The failure of new states to have a government with a monopoly of armed force is often
considered as one of the major reasons of a “failed” state (See Iqbal and Starr (2008) for more
discussion on failed state).
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these military units transformed into political parties or were allied with politicians who
share the same ethnicity or communal roots. This resulted in political parties that
possessed military wings. Some armed organizations refused to take part in new state
building, demanding for the independent state in the region. In this sense, warfare against
the colonial power was a contributing factor to the creation of military capabilities for
indigenous groups, including the group who came to power after independence.
In sum, colonial rule and the decolonization process have had profound effects on
the path of new states of the twentieth century by interrupting the development of the
nation state building. It has created opportunities for instability, which are favorable for
internal armed conflict after independence. Environmentally, colonial powers established
artificially defined territories and populations that do not reflect history and ethnic
divisions of the region. This artificiality of the territories and the population increased
internal instability of the state by causing the legitimacy crisis of ruling regime. Colonial
rule has created military capabilities as well. Colonial powers developed modern military
forces and trained them, and when they left the country, colonial military became the
national military forces that had the modern military structure and knowledge. In
addition, armed struggle for independence against colonial powers offered indigenous
groups experience with experience modern warfare. It also brought about their
militarization, which resulted in the existence of multiple armed forces within certain
territory. In this sense, this period of colonization and decolonization has created the
“right” setting, that is, “opportunity,” for eruption of internal armed conflict in the new
states after their independence.
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3.5 MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND OPPORTUNITY TO SUPPRESS
Most and Starr explain that some capabilities must be created or invented, so as to
be a part of the possibilities available to actors. Yet, such capabilities are unevenly
distributed among actors. Only those who have the capability can take action and become
involved in certain situations (Most and Starr 1989, 32). This is the case in intrastate
conflict as well.
When it faces such challenges, the regime has two options. One solution is to
accept opposition groups’ demands and ultimately strengthen the state by eliminating
internal contradictions that may give rise to or exacerbate internal conflict (Alagappa
1987, 20). This includes enhancing political equality and participation, and social and
economic development. This option can be a viable solution to the legitimacy crisis.
However, it can undermine the power status of the incumbent regime and harm the
political and territorial integrity of the state. The other way to deal with internal
challenges is through means of suppression, which can be a more preferable option to the
incumbent regime. Alagappa (1987) defines suppression as “a type of military policy and
is designed to eliminate the dissidents and simultaneously entrench the position of the
regime in power (1987, 21).” Although it is a short-term solution, it is a more effective
and fast way to put down insurgencies.
After independence, leaders in new states hoped to emulate the military success of
the Western countries by imitating Western institutional arrangement (Smith 1986). They
wanted to enjoy the superior legal status of a nation-state with a strong army as their
formal colonial power had. As a symbol of national independence and visible signs of
sovereignty, strengthening the national military was the top priority in many postcolonial
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states (Welch 1978). Especially when a ruling regime suffers from the legitimacy
problem, it tends to invest heavily in military and security apparatus. Indeed, unlike the
Western or developed countries where the national military is called upon and supposed
to fight against foreign enemy, armed forces in new states have been frequently used to
put down the domestic challengers. Therefore, sufficient military capability with a welldeveloped security apparatus is another important conditional factor that creates the
opportunity for suppression.
In sum, the colonial experience and military capabilities of the state create the
“opportunity” for internal instability in the new states. Yet in formulating security
policies, governments make a decision between repression and accommodation based on
the consideration of the domestic, regional, and international dimensions of state security.
In the following section, I develop the Three Dimensionality Model of state security to
explain governments’ decisions in the face of insurgency and the development of severe
armed conflict.
3.6 NEW OPPORTUNITY AFTER INDEPENDENCE: THE THREE DIMENSIONALITY MODEL OF
STATE SECURITY AND ARMED CONFLICT
Independence brought new opportunities to postcolonial states. The nature of the
new environment was very dynamic and all aspects of their security were highly
interconnected. In such circumstances, it becomes difficult to distinguish between
domestic and foreign affairs. Domestic affairs are inevitably influenced by external
factors and vice versa, and decisions in one arena could lead to an unexpected result in
the other arenas. Therefore, decision makers of the state should consider the multidimensional nature of the issue when they make a decision. When it comes to a security
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issue, decision makers have to think of the multidimensionality of the issue and the
possible consequences more seriously since it is directly related to the survival of the
incumbent regime. Knowing how international and regional security systems operate and
how they influence the domestic affairs of the postcolonial states helps us to understand
the context of civil conflict with a more comprehensive perspective. Based on the
previous discussion of security in the new states born in the twentieth century, I develop a
theory of the Three Dimensionality Model of state security to examine how domestic,
regional, and international dimensions of security concerns affect the regime’s policy of
enacting military operations to deal with internal challenge.
3.6.1 Domestic Dimension
As discussed, many postcolonial states have suffered from the crisis of legitimacy
and faced internal challenges to their authority. The insurgent may aim at throwing the
incumbent regime from power, or require the succession of occupying a region to
establish an independent state. In both cases, this can be a serious security problem for
the incumbent regime.
Remaining in power is the first and foremost goal of the incumbent regime.
Motives of certain decisions and behaviors of governments have been explained by this
self-interested motive (Gleditsch, Hegre, and Strand 2009).15 Regime change, whether
peaceful or violent, brings about internal instability to some extent.16 While it can be an
opportunity for rebel groups to make their demand, the level of internal instability may
15

Narrowly-defined self-interest is closely related to the assumption of the selectorate theory that
political survival is the essence of politics and the key motivation of leaders (Bueno de Mesquita
et al. 2003).
16
“Stability,” as a complex concept, has a number of dimensions and can be operationalized in a
number of ways. In this research, I focus on political stability and operationalize it in terms of
regime consolidation.
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increase. Under this situation, a new government needs to consolidate its rule as
efficiently as possible for longer tenure. Again, there are several options for a
government to cope with the situation, but the choice of the government depends on the
extent of its power status. When the regime’s power status is weak, it suffers from a lack
of hierarchical control over the elites who can be a potential adversary and control over
the whole country. Because of its weak status, it needs support not only from internal
elites groups but also from a sector in society in order to consolidate its rule.17 To reach
an accommodation with a rebel group is one way to gain its support. However, unstable
power status of the ruling regime tends to bring about recurrent instability in domestic
politics because the fundamental reason of weak government power usually stems from a
legitimacy problem, which cannot be solved easily. Conflicts between a government and
a rebel group tend to be renewed over and over again since short tenure of incumbent
regime and frequent regime changes render the promises of government invalidated.
Proposition 1. When domestic politics and the rule of an incumbent regime are
stable, the regime is more likely to suppress a rebel group. On the other hand,
when domestic politics are unstable and a ruling regime suffers from internal
instability, the regime is more likely to avoid a military solution in response to a
rebel group. It is because it needs internal support and the priority is to
consolidate power through stabilizing internal affairs as soon as possible. Due to
continued instability in internal politics, however, the government cannot have a
firm basis for consistent policies in regards to the opposition group, which results
in a cycle of conflict and cease-fire.

17

One might ask under what conditions a “sector” becomes the insurgent group. Possible answers
are possession of an armed wing due to the failure of state’s monopoly of military apparatus,
external military support to this sector, the absence of democratic means to act against the
government, and forming an anti-government alliance of sectors. This is certainly an interesting
question, but requires separate in-depth research.
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3.6.2 Regional Dimension
Although suppression is a preferable option, due to its susceptibility to external
influence, the regime should consider the external dimension of internal conflict when
making a final decision. The external dimension consists of two levels: regional and
international. The regional dimension involves the competition for regional power
between neighboring states and attempts of intervention from regional competitors in
domestic issues.
The departure of the colonial powers created a regional power vacuum in which
there was no absolute preeminent regional power. In the absence of an absolute regional
power center, the interstate tensions have escalated. States not merely compete for
regional power but also try to maintain a favorable external environment. The stronger
states attempt to preserve a favorable status quo while its principal challengers try to
change the prevailing balance in their favor (Ayoob 1995, 50).
Intervening in neighboring states’ domestic affairs is the most common way of
attempting to preserve or change the regional balance of power. States weaken the
neighboring regional competitors by supporting the secessionist movement or movements
for regime change. Strong external military assistance is vital for the insurgents of course.
Yet, this strategic relationship is beneficial for external supporters as well since it is an
effective way to exhaust rivalry states. Therefore, when the competition for regional
power intensifies, the extent of military support to the insurgencies in the rivalry states is
more likely to increase.
For the incumbent regime, intervention from regional competitors in domestic
affairs is a serious security problem. It disturbs internal order and the survival of the
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regime. Besides, it jeopardizes the regional power status of the country. Thus when it
finds that the regional competitor attempts an intervention through military support, the
regime is more likely to launch a large-scale military operation to put down the
insurgents. In other words, when the insurgencies invite external military support from
the regional competitor, and it threatens the regional power status of the state, the level of
the military operation will be intensified.
Proposition 2. A decision on military operations against insurgents is affected by
regional power competition. When the regime finds that domestic instability
invites external intervention from rival states and it endangers the regime’s
domestic and regional power status, the government is more likely to suppress the
insurgents more heavily.
3.6.3 International Dimension
The new states of the twentieth century are permeable to global politics as well.
The international dimension stresses systemic factors such as polarity and the superpower
competition, and the pressure from “patron” states. The Cold War (and the end of Cold
War) opened a new chapter of global politics. Politically motivated intervention from the
powerful states in domestic and regional issues has become common in the post World
War period.
The bipolarity of the global balance of power started with the end of World War
II. The colonial powers were replaced with the superpowers that sought political,
economic, and military advantages in a region. The superpowers aggressively approached
the new states for their interests with the enormous economic and military resources, and
intruded into the domestic and regional affairs of these states. The most significant
means of intervention from the superpowers is control of arms supply and various types
of military and economic aids (Buzan 1988). Especially, the asymmetric relationship
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between the superpowers and these states gave superpowers diplomatic leverage to
influence the policies of the “client” states.
External arms supply and weapons technology transfer is essential for the new
states of the twentieth century (Ayoob 1995). Artificially defined territorial boundaries
and the arbitrary allocated state population affect not only internal instability of the states,
but also regional instabilities. The contiguous states often disputed over contested
territories and populations. The regional instability, together with the competition for the
dominant regional power with neighboring states, required expending efforts in
strengthening military power. Regional arms races accelerated accordingly. It facilitated
the possession of high capability weapons and brought about a significant expansion of
the size of military forces. However, a lack of military infrastructure and financial
resources has led the states to find external assistance from the great powers. Armed
conflicts bring about a massive increase in military spending and resources. For the state
that lacks internal capabilities, therefore, support from the outside is critical. This makes
the states vulnerable to changes in international politics and superpower policies toward
the region and themselves. Thus, the superpowers’ stance on domestic affairs regarding
the insurgencies is important in the regime’s decision on military operations.
Proposition 3. Superpower competition affects the military capabilities of the
postcolonial states. Politically-motivated arms supplies and aid from the
superpowers improve the capabilities of the state, yet client-patron relationships
with the superpowers make the state vulnerable to its patron state’s political and
military strategy in the region and their country. Therefore, as the dependency on
the superpower is high, the regime is more likely to follow the patron state’s
policy.
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3.7 CONCLUSION
The Three Dimensionality Model of state security and armed conflict can be
summarized below:
Government decision on repression or compromise = Domestic stability
(measured as the extent of regime consolidation) + Regional power competition
(measured as regional intervention and supports to the insurgent group) +
Superpower preference (measured as the extent of dependency on the
superpowers and superpower preference for military solution)
Readdressing the propositions, I argue that an incumbent regime is more likely to repress
when the rule of an incumbent regime is stable, when there is external intervention from
rival states, and when the regime relies less on superpowers or superpowers support the
regime’s decision regarding military operation.
One thing that should be pointed out is that the theoretical model of this research
is confined to authoritarian regimes and applies less to new democracies. There are
several reasons for this. The model mainly tries to explain the outbreak of intensive
armed conflict according to a government’s response to an insurgency. It assumes that
when the government represses the insurgent group with armed forces, there is a high
chance that we observe civil conflict. Yet, a heavy military operation to suppress its
nationals is usually the least preferable option in democratic countries. Even if the
incumbent administration wants to choose that option, the government should form a
social consensus on a military action first, and the decision has to be approved by other
parts of state institutions such as the legislature. A weak bond between the military and
the incumbent regime in new democratic states also renders a military option less
preferable. These different domestic circumstances and political mechanisms may lead
democratic regimes to deal with internal opposition groups in a more peaceful way.
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Limiting the applicability of the model to democracies does not reduce the explanatory
power of the theory since the phenomenon of civil conflict is more prevalent in nondemocratic countries and the intensity of conflict varies across these countries.
The following chapter introduces a methodology and research design of the present
research. The chapter describes some features of comparative case studies and justifies
the choice of the method of “controlled comparison.” Then, the chapter introduces a
research design of this research
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CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY
“Virtually all empirical social research involves comparison of some sort” (Ragin
1987, 1). Comparison enables researchers to make statements about empirical regularity
and an interpretation of their study relative to theoretical criteria (Ragin 1987). A case is
“an instance of a class of events (George and Bennett 2005, 17).” Classes of events, such
as revolutions and wars, are not simply given by history, but the social construction of
political actors and the researchers who define the concepts (Bennett and Checkel 2015,
8). Comparison of a set of cases based on theoretical parsimony provides a solution to the
problem of relying on correlations of variables in support of claims of causality. This is a
common criticism of large N cross-national research. Conducting intensive studies on a
few cases allows for the investigation of causal mechanisms, which clarifies the reasons
of correlations between the variables (Gerring 2007; Goertz and Mahoney 2012). In this
chapter, I introduce comparative case studies. I describe some features of comparative
case studies and justify the choice of the method of “controlled comparison” as the main
analytical tool of this research. Then, I present a research design with a special emphasis
on a case selection.
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4.1 COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES: RESEARCH QUESTION, THEORY, AND PURPOSIVE
SAMPLING
The selection of methodology should be decided based on a research question and
theoretical propositions. One should think carefully about what kind of methodology can
be best to answer one’s research question and examine the propositions. In this sense,
thechoice of methodology is highly related to the nature of a research question and
theory. Yin (2014) explains that case studies are most likely to be appropriate for “how”
and “why” questions:
“How and “why” questions are more explanatory and likely to lead to the use of a
case study, history, or experiment as the preferred research method. This is
because such questions deal with operational links needing to be traced over time,
rather than mere frequencies or incidence (Yin 2014, 10).
Similarly, George and Bennett (2005) argue that “case studies remain much stronger at
assessing whether and how a variable mattered to the outcome than at assessing how
much it mattered” (25). Therefore, the important task in choosing methodology is to
clarify the nature of research questions and theoretical arguments (Yin 2014).
In most qualitative research, cases are deliberatively selected. Unlike quantitative
research for which a large sample of cases is randomly selected, a few cases are chosen
on the basis of theory. Theory and theoretical propositions are a guide to the selection of
cases, and thus sampling is purposive and non-probabilistic (Patton 2002; Merriam 2009;
Yin 2014). Purposive and nonprobability sampling contribute to the inferential process by
enabling researchers to choose the most appropriate cases for a given research strategy,
which contributes to the inferential process (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 295-296).
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Purposive and nonprobability sampling, as opposed to probability sampling, is
based on the assumption that the researcher must deliberately select a sample that helps to
gain plentiful information and insights (Merriam 2009). Therefore, the cases that will
yield the most relevant and ample data should be selected. These cases are called
information-rich cases (Yin 2016, 93; Patton 2002). In order to identify the most relevant
and information-rich cases for purposive sampling, it is critical to determine the selection
criteria. In creating a set of such criteria, researchers should also justify why the criteria
are important (Merriam 2009).
4.2 THE METHOD OF CONTROLLED COMPARISON
Among the various methods of comparative case studies, I choose the method of
“controlled comparison,” which is the comparison of “most similar” cases. Comparative
case studies are highly related to the usage of experimental or quasi-experimental logic in
social science research. One of the main goals of every study is to explain the influence
of a variable(s) on a phenomenon of interest. A key issue in achieving this goal is to
control the effect of other possible variables. Experimental logic assumes that we can
isolate the effect of a variable of interest by controlling the other factors that might affect
the outcome in a certain setting. In this sense, the experimental method is the ideal
method for scientific explanation (Lijphart 1971, 683). As Singer (1977) points out,
however, it is impossible to completely control the effect of other possible explanatory
variables, even in the laboratory or field experiments.
The issue of “controlling” is central to Lijphart (1971)’s discussion on the “many
variables, small N” problem of the comparative method. While the former is a common
problem in all social science research regardless of the particular method, the latter is
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particularly more problematic to the comparative method (Lijphart 1971, 685). One way
to deal with the “many variables, small N” problem is to focus the comparative analysis
on “comparable” cases. Cases are “comparable” because they are similar in a large
number of characteristics, which are treated as constants, but dissimilar in a few
variables. The strength of the comparative method is that while the total number of
variables cannot be reduced, it enables researchers to study the relationship between
variables of interest under controlled conditions (Lijphart 1971, 687).
Comparing “most similar” cases is a specific mean to establish control. Selected
cases are similar in all background conditions except the variable(s) of interest
(Seawright and Gerring 2008). The variable(s) of interest is thought to account for
different outcomes (George and Bennett 2004, 81). Thus, it is a useful method when two
or a small number of cases look similar, but the outcomes are different. There are two
easy but efficient ways to maximize comparability. One is to adopt the area approach as a
basis of selection. Cases from the same area share not only geographic proximity but also
socio-cultural similarities. The other is to conduct a diachronic analysis. That is, the same
unit of analysis can be compared at different times. A researcher can take maximum
advantage of using the method of controlled comparison when a longitudinal case is
divided into two or more sub-cases and compared (Lijphart 1971).
This method of controlled comparison is appropriate for a confirmatory mode of
analysis in a hypothesis-testing research design, where the research design begins with a
set of hypotheses and the analysis is conducted deductively (Gerring 2008).
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4.3 ANALYTIC GENERALIZATION
While researchers can gain in-depth knowledge and comprehensive understanding
by conducting single case studies, research that relies solely on one case suffers from the
problem of representativeness (Seawright and Gerring 2008). Critics of case studies point
out that it is hard to make an inference and generalization from one case. Comparative
cases studies have an advantage in this regard since studying multiple cases allows
researchers to achieve analytic generalization. Analytic generalization is a manner of
generalizing the finding of a study to other situations that were not studied based on
logical argument, theory development, or replication (Yin 2016, 333). In contrast to
statistical generalization, the purpose of which is to generalize the results of the research
from the sample to populations on the basis of probabilistic claims, the purpose of
analytic generalization is to generalize findings of the study from a selected case to other
situations on the basis of analytic claims (Yin 2016).
Analytic generalization can be achieved by replication logic. There are two ways
of establishing replication logic: a literal replication and a theoretical replication. For
literal replication, selected cases have similar settings and are expected to predict similar
results. For a theoretical replication, on the other hand, cases that have different settings
are selected and expected to predict contrasting results but for anticipatable reasons (Yin
2014, 57).
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4.4 RESEARCH DESIGN
4.4.1 Cases of Iraqi-Kurdish Conflicts: Justification of Case Selection and the Method of
Controlled Comparison
Regarding the nature of research questions and theoretical propositions,
comparative case studies can be the most appropriate for this research. As discussed, this
research aims at explaining why civil conflict occurs in some countries, why we observe
differences in the severity and intensity of conflict, and how the three dimensions in a
state’s politics influence the government’s security decisions on rebellion, resulting in
violence conflict.
For purposive sampling, I list a set of criteria. The first criterion for this research
is that the state where conflict takes place is located in the region in which the dynamics
of international and regional politics are manifested. This research emphasizes the
important impact of colonial experience on internal instability in postcolonial states.
Also, it tries to investigate the influence of superpowers and the state’s regional
competition on the ruling regime’s decision regarding insurgency. Variation and changes
in external environment and foreign politics of a state can help examine whether or not
and how these factors make a difference in the course of conflict development. Second,
the state in which conflict takes place has experienced ups and downs in its domestic
politics. This criterion ensures that we can examine how the extent of stability in internal
politics affects the regime’s response to rebellion. Third, there should be multiple conflict
episodes between the government and rebel forces over the same issue, and each episode
should be different in terms of the level of severity. Studying and comparing a series of
conflicts with the same rebel group over a long period of time helps to focus intensively
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on the influence of changes in internal and external circumstances on the severity of
conflict more accurately since it allows assuming that other factors are more or less
constant. In this way, I can establish controls in the experimental manner as discussed
earlier.
Based on these criteria, I choose the set of Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts as the main
cases to compare. Iraq satisfies the listed criteria in many aspects. The Middle East region
has been susceptible to international politics. It was the place in which superpower
countries have been fiercely pursuing their political and economic interests. In the late
1800s and early 1900s, the region was divided into several countries and mandated by
Britain and France. After World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union competed
for hegemony in the region by pouring enormous aid along with establishing alliances.
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been directly and indirectly
interfering in domestic and regional affairs of the countries in the region. Regional
relations among the countries are also dynamic. Many states are engaged in enduring
rivalry relations. International and intra-national conflicts often occur, rendering the
region more conflictual than other regions in the world. The geographic location of Iraq
satisfies the first criterion very well in this regard. Iraq satisfies the second criterion as
well. Since independence, Iraqi domestic politics have shown a broad spectrum in levels
of stability from maximum instability caused by a series of military coup d’état to
minimum instability based on strong authoritarianism. The Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts also
fulfill the third criterion. The Iraqi-Kurdish conflict began in the early stages of Iraqi
statehood. Advocating the independent Kurdish state in Iraq, the Kurdish rebel groups
have constantly provoked armed conflict against the ruling regime. In the dynamic
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political environment inside and outside, the regime has been dealing with the Kurdish
rebellion with various ways. The difference in intensity among conflict episodes between
the Iraqi regime and the Iraqi Kurds allows me not only to obtain much information on
context of conflict but also to investigate how the three dimensions in state security
affairs influence the state’s decision and the severity of conflict.
As mentioned, the method of controlled comparison is appropriate when the cases
are comparable in all respects except for the variable(s) of interest (George and Bennett
2004, 81). On the basis of the method of controlled comparison, I compare the three
phases of the Iraqi-Kurdish conflict: The 1961-1970 conflict, the 1974-1975 conflict, and
the 1985-1988 conflict. Three critical junctures in Iraqi modern history – the 1958 Iraqi
Revolution, the 1968 military coup d’état and the emergence of the Baath regime, and the
emergence of Saddam Hussein’s totalitarian regime in 1979 – are criteria for dividing the
phases. Each phase represents one case. One of the criticisms on the method of controlled
comparison is that it is hard to expect that background settings and control variables will
remain constant in the real world. Yet, comparison of different phases of the IraqiKurdish conflicts help to handle the criticisms since it has the same effect of controlling
the influence of other factors. Historical background, aims of the Kurdish, and actors in
conflict remained the same while the main interests of this research – domestic, regional,
international circumstances – differed in each phase. As for collecting evidence, this
research primarily relies on documentation such as government documents, reports, and
official letters. Archival records, such as organizational records, interviews, and
newspapers, and secondary sources are also important sources.
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4.4.2 Cases of the 2011 Arab Spring: Selecting the 2011 Arab uprising in Egypt and
Libya for Analytic Generalization
In searching for analytic generalization through replication logic, I conduct a set
of comparative studies to see whether and how the findings from the Iraqi-Kurdish cases
work in other situations. There are also selection criteria used to choose these cases. First,
the event to be studied should have occurred in the same region with Iraq. States in the
same region share similar history and culture to some extent. Limiting the location of an
event helps minimize the background effect that comes from cultural and societal
differences. Second, while the aims of movements are more or less similar, two chosen
cases should display contrasting outcomes, where a severe conflict takes place in one
case, but only a minor clash breaks out in the other case. This criterion allows me to
conduct both literal and theoretical replication. Third, a recent event is more preferable.
Studying a recent event gives an opportunity to evaluate the usefulness of my theoretical
framework by seeing if it can explain political phenomena regardless of time period.
Based on the above criteria, I choose the so-called Arab Spring. In 2011,
unexpected mass uprising swept the entire region. Starting from a small town in Tunisia,
it soon spread across the Middle East and North Africa. Protestors shouted slogans
against ruling regimes and demanded democratization in their respective countries.
While the aims and reasons of the uprising were similar, the results of the uprising in
each country varied.
Among the countries in which the Arab Spring occurred, I select Egypt and Libya
to compare. I apply key findings from the cases of Iraqi-Kurdish conflict to the 2011
Arab uprising in Egypt and Libya, and see whether and how the findings from the Iraqi-
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Kurdish cases work in the two more recent events that took place in the region. Egypt and
Libya were the first two countries after Tunisia that experienced the Arab Spring.
Although the two popular uprisings have the same purpose – toppling the ruling regime –
and broke out in the states that share some commonalities, the outcomes were totally
different. In Egypt, the ruling regime resigned without a major clash within a few days
after the uprising began, while in Libya, a severe armed conflict occurred between the
government and the opposition groups, lasting for several months. Investigating the
factors that brought about such differences, based on the key findings of the IraqiKurdish cases, will contribute to analytic generalization of this research’s theoretical
framework. I use same types of data as the Iraqi-Kurdish cases for the cases of Egyptian
uprising and Libyan civil conflict. Table 4.1 presents detailed information on the data
sources used in the case studies.
Table 4.1 Detailed Information on the Data Sources
Government Documents
Documents published by the Iraqi Baath Regime (Revolutionary Iraq 1968-1973)
Documents released by Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Online documents of Kurdistan regional government representative to the United States
The United States’ Government Documents
Circular Airgrams from the Department of State
Congressional Bills
Congressional Research Service Report
Country Studies of Iran, Iraq, and Libya
Intelligence notes from the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Letter from the Ambassador to Iran to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs
Memorandums
Online document of the Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
Online document of U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security
Presidential Remarks
Telegrams from the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State
Reports from Governmental and Non-governmental Organizations
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Human Rights Watch
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Stockholm International Peace Research Institution (SIPRI)
The United Nations
Magazines
Arab Report and Record published between 1976-1978
Middle East Record 1961
Speeches
Winston Churchill (a speech given in the House of Commons on 14 June 1921)
Articles, Letters, and Memoirs by British Officers in Iraq
Memoir from Wallace Lyon (a British officer who was stationed in Iraq in the early
1990s)
Article by T.E Lawrence (a British military officer who took part in the Great Arab
Revolt)
Letters from Gertrude Bell (a powerful official of the British administration in Baghdad
after the First World War)
Data Set
Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) Dataset
Powell and Thyne (2011) Military coup dataset
The World Bank
News Media
Aljazeera
BBC News
CNN News
Guardian
New York Times
Petroleum Press Service
Prava
Radio Baghdad
Reuter
Truthout News
The Washington Post
The following two chapters contain empirical studies. In chapter five, I conduct
comparative case study of three phases in the Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts. In chapter six, I
analyze and compare the two Arab uprisings that occurred in Egypt and Libya to find out
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whether and how the findings from the Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts work in the other two
cases.
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CHAPTER 5
EMPIRICAL STUDY I: THE IRAQI-KURDISH CONFLICTS
5.1 COMPARING CASES
This chapter compares three phases of the Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts from 1961 to
1988: The 1961-1970 conflicts, the 1974-1975 conflict, and the 1985-1988 conflicts.
These conflicts differ in terms of the number of casualties, duration, and the outcomes.
The first Iraqi-Kurdish war erupted in 1961 and occurred intermittently until
March 1970, when the March Agreement was reached. During the ten years of fighting,
the conflict often ended in a stalemate without a clear winner, and the two parties often
reached a provisional compromise. According to the Correlates of War Project handbook,
during this time there were three conflicts between Iraq and the Kurds, and each conflict
ended with a cease-fire agreement (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). Partial autonomy was
granted to the Kurds, at least for a certain amount of time, and the intensity and severity
of the conflicts was relatively low.
The second Iraqi-Kurdish conflict broke out in March 1974 and lasted until April
1975. Iraq launched an offensive against the Kurds when the leader of the Kurdish
Democratic Party (KDP), Mullah Mustafa Barzani, rejected Iraq’s final offer for Kurdish
autonomy. The conflict was fiercer and bloodier than the previous first phase conflict.
The number of casualties was higher in a short period of time. Iraq employed
conventional combat methods. Advanced weaponry and the military were committed to
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the battle (Bengio 2012). The Iraqi government did not offer a compromise at this time
and the Kurdish rebel forces were quelled. The third Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts occurred
from 1985 to 1988. It was the most brutal and tragic episode in the history of IraqiKurdish conflict. The Kurds launched an offensive against Iraq in 1985 during the IranIraq war, and Iraq operated a counterinsurgency campaign against the Kurds, which
included the Anfal genocidal campaign and a poison gas attack on the town of Halabja.
The Anfal campaign started with chemical weapon attacks on April 15 1987, which were
the first of at least forty documented chemical attacks on Kurdish targets over the
succeeding eighteen months.18 The campaign was the last step in a three-stage program of
village clearances or collectivization by the Baathist regime. More than 700 villages were
destroyed by the first and second operation from April 21 to June 20 1987. The full
destruction was carried out by the third stage, which took place between February 23 and
September 6, 1988. During the Anfal campaign, tens of thousands of Kurds died. Precise
numbers of the casualties are not available, but Human Rights Watch roughly estimates
somewhere between 50,000 and 100,000 rural Kurds died during Anfal.19 In March 1988,
Iraqi government airplanes dropped chemical weapons on the town of Halabja, and
between 4,000 and 5,000 people were killed in one such assault.20
Why did the conflicts occur? Why did the Iraqi regime decide to go to war instead
of compromising? Why do we observe such differences in the course of the conflicts in
each phase? In the following sections, I will analyze and compare the opportunities of the
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Human Rights Watch. 1993. https://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/ANFALPRE.htm
(accessed October 11, 2016).
19
Ibid.
20
Kurdistan Regional Government-Iraq: Representation in the United States.
http://www.us.gov.krd/faqs/general-information/important-events-in-modern-history/ (accessed
October 11, 2016).
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Table 5.1 Comparison of Cases

The Conflicts in the
1960s
(1961-1970)

The Conflict of
1974-1975

The Conflict of
1985-1988
(Including the Anfal
campaign and a
chemical attack on
Halabja)

Dates
September
11, 1961 –
November
22, 1963

Casualties
Kurds: 2,000
Iraq: 500
(Battle-related
deaths)

Outcome
Stalemate: The conflict ended
when the new Baath government
announced that it would seek a
negotiated settlement to the war.
A cease-fire was signed in
February 1964 that generally held
until fighting resumed in 1965.
April 3, 1965 Kurds: 2,500
Compromise: A cease-fire was
– June 21,
Iraq: 500
arranged after the army lost
1966
(Battle-related several battles against the
deaths)
Kurdish Peshmerga. The fighting
had ended in a stalemate and in
the subsequent agreement the
Kurds were recognized as part of
a binational state and their rights
were to be ensured.
January 3,
Kurds: 3,200
Compromise: In March 1970 the
1969 – March Iraq: 800
conflict ended when the
11, 1970
(Battle-related government again guaranteed
deaths)
Kurdish rights (The March
Agreement)
March 18,
Kurds: 13,000 Iraq wins: The Kurds were able to
1974 – April Iraq: 7000
resist the attack of Iraq’s
3, 1975
(Battle-related 100,000-troop army, but after
deaths)
Iranian and U.S. aid was
withdrawn, the Kurds were
quickly defeated.
January 1985 Battle-related Iraq wins: In the Anfal campaign,
– September
deaths were
50,000 by the most conservative
6, 1988
unknown.
estimate and possibly twice that
Tens of
number were killed and
thousands of
disappeared. Between 4,000 and
Kurdish
5,000 were killed in Halabja.
civilians and
60,000 Kurds fled to refugee
fighters were
camps in Turkey and Iran, and
killed.
hundreds of thousands forced into
exile.

Source: Sarkees and Wayman 2010; Human Rights Watch 1993; BBC News21; Kurdistan
Regional Government-Iraq.

21

“Iraqi Kurdistan Profile – Timeline,” BBC News, August 1, 2015.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-15467672 (accessed October 11, 2016).
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state of Iraq and the Iraqi regimes – its capabilities and internal and external
circumstances – and to see how these factors affected development of the Iraqi-Kurdish
conflicts and brought about the differences in the course of the three phases. First,
emphasizing the importance of historical context, I will argue that colonial rule and the
experience under the British regime crated a source of internal instability in Iraq. I then
explore Iraq’s military development and its increasing military capabilities over time, and
how it is related to Iraq’s policy of suppression. Lastly, considering the political
dimensions – domestic, regional, and international – of the new states in their security
policy decisions, I will compare the difference of these three levels, and analyze how
their differences affected Iraq’s policy towards the Kurds and influenced the course of the
Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts.
5.2 BRITISH RULE AND THE CREATION OF AN OPPORTUNITY FOR INTERNAL INSTABILITY
5.2.1 Arbitrarily Established Territories and Populations
The state of Iraq was created under British mandate from the League of Nations.
Its borders included the Ottoman provinces of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul. Known as
Mesopotamia historically, these provinces were occupied during World War I by the
British forces. They captured the Basra province in the south in the fall of 1915, and
Baghdad in the center in March 1917. Finally, Mosul province in the north was captured
in November 1918. Despite its differences in culture, language, and ethnicity, the British
included the Mosul province in the new state’s borders because of its promising oil
deposits (Keegan 1983, 283). These arbitrarily defined borders have become a
fundamental cause of ongoing conflicts between the Iraqi regimes and the Kurds.
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In the military campaign in Mesopotamia during World War I, Britain concluded
the secret Sykes-Picot agreement with France, which divided the large part of the
Ottoman territories into five zones and placed them under the two countries’ control.
Britain and France argued that the agreement was made to create and protect the Arab
states, but it only served the interests of the two countries. They were allowed to establish
direct or indirect administration as they wanted. Also, it gave Britain and France the
guarantee of freedom of transit of their goods through some of the main ports, such as
Alexandrea and Haifa in the region. In addition, it gave Britain the right to build,
administer, and solely own a railway connecting Baghdad and Haifa.22
This secret agreement between Britain and France was discussed at the 1919 Paris
Peace Conference, and it was completed in April 1920 at the San Remo Conference. The
Allies approved the framework of the Treaty of Sèvres, which abolished the Ottoman
Empire and provided independence to nations in the old Ottoman provinces. For the
provinces of Syria and Mesopotamia, two mandates were created instead of their being
granted independence right away. It was mandated that France would govern the areas of
what is now Syria and Lebanon on the modern map. Britain would have the mandate for
Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq. Britain particularly wanted to include Iraq in their
territories because of Iraq’s proximity to India and its oil production (Holden 2012).
The decision over the mandate territories and the plan to establish the Iraqi
nation-state including all of the three provinces of Mesopotamia ignored the diversity of
the population within the three provinces and their distinct religious and cultural
differences – especially, for the Kurds in the Mosul province who not only had a different
22

“The Sykes-Picot Agreement,” BBC News, November 29, 2001.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/middle_east/2001/israel_and_the_palestinians/key_document
s/1681362.stm (accessed October 11, 2016).
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ethnicity, language, and history, but also had a long tradition of struggling for
independence. As one of the largest ethnic groups without their own country, they
inhabited Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq. The largest population was the Turkish Kurds, but
it is Iraqi Kurds who have been most active politically (Metz 1988).
In fact, the Kurds were promised their autonomy from the allied powers when the
Treaty of Sèvres in August 1920 was concluded. The Kurds had sent representatives to
the 1919 Paris Peace Conference where the Treaty of Sèvres was discussed. This
promise, however, was invalidated by Britain at the Cairo Conference in 1921. In 1923,
the Treaty of Lausanne was signed and the areas in which the Kurds had inhabited were
awarded to Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. The aspiration of the Kurds for their independent state
was frustrated again. In sum, the British decision to include the Kurds of the Mosul
province in the new Iraqi state was made without consideration of the Kurds’ ethnic and
historical differences from the Arabs, and only based on Britain’s interest in the large oil
deposits of the province. This decision became a main source of instability in Iraq as well
as the region.
Another source of instability stemmed from the Britain’s establishment of a
monarchy and the imposition of King Faisal as a leader of the new Iraqi state. Assuming
that they could transfer the Indian model of colonial rule to Iraq, the British neither
associated with local elites nor exercised authority through local institution. Instead, they
exercised the policy of direct rule at first (Holden 2012, 53). With little knowledge about
the provinces, however, this policy brought about strong antipathy against the British,
and resulted in the 1920 Iraqi revolt. In the Review of Civil Administration of
Mesopotamia, Gertrude Bell, Oriental Secretary in Iraq, portrayed the Iraqi people’s
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reaction to the mandate, and how the Sunni and Shi’i religious sectors, as well as tribes,
cooperated with each other for the first time in the modern history of Iraq:
The announcement that Great Britain had accepted the mandate for Mesopotamia
was made on 3 May…The announcement spurred the nationalists to fresh
activity…the deep prejudices which separate the Sunni and Shi’ah sects were
temporarily overcome…the political significance of the reconciliation became
apparent.23
The outbreak of the Iraqi revolt in 1920 brought about a negative response from
British public to the British mandate of Iraq and the policy of direct rule between the
British leadership and the public. In order to reduce costs and decrease anti-imperial
sentiments of the Iraqis, Britain gave up the policy of direct rule. Instead, they decided to
switch to indirect rule, establishing a constitutional monarchy, the regime that would be a
“friend” of Britain. That is, it was not a genuine attempt to improve Iraq’s statehood, but
a tactical gesture to pacify the Iraqi people. In a speech given in the House of Commons
on 14 June 1921, Winston S. Churchill, colonial secretary in 1921, made their intention
and new policy toward Iraq clear:
Our policy in Mesopotamia is to reduce our commitments and to extricate
ourselves from our burdens while at the same time honourably discharging our
obligations and building up a strong and effective Arab government which will
always be the friend of Britain.24
Britain’s idea of establishing the monarchy in Iraq reveals its ignorance of the
province they were ruling again. The framework of Britain’s indirect rule was discussed
at the 1921 Cairo conference. At the conference, Faisal bin Hussein was selected as Iraq’s
first king, who was a descendent of the family of the Prophet Muhammad and whose
23
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ancestors had held political authority in the cities of Mecca and Medina. Also, the British
thought that the Iraqi nationalists would accept him as a legitimate leader of the Iraq state
because of his role in the 1916 revolt against the Ottomans (Metz 1988). However, the
decision of establishing a monarchy aroused strong opposition since the monarchy was
regarded as a creation of the British Empire. It suffered from a legitimacy crisis from the
beginning. Moreover, the elected constituent Assembly was neither popular nor
representative. It was almost entirely composed of members of the Sunni Arab urban
communities who were a minority and formed less than 25 percent of the total population
(Sluglett 2007, 6).
As a discriminated ethnic minority, the Kurds found the imposition of Faisal as
King of Iraq unacceptable. Although it was said to be a free election, the Kurds in the
Mosul province were ordered to vote for Faisal. A British officer, Wallace Lyon,
described how British officers were commanded to direct the Kurdish people in the
election. He was stationed in Arbil – a large city fifty miles east of Mosul – at the time of
the election of Faisal:
… The next notification published the fact that the British government’s
candidate for the election was Amir Faisal, and to all of us Political Officers there
came a top secret coded telegram instructing us to use all our influence, personal
and official, to persuade the people to elect Faisal. For me this was a tough
assignment, as the great majority of the people were Kurds who cared little for
any Arab prince, and like all hill men despised the dwellers of the plains… The
tribal chiefs and city elders were gathered together and asked to sign the petition
for Faisal… They were reluctant and asked about other candidates.25
Combined with the failed aspiration to be an independent state, establishing the new
leader, who did not have any connection with the Kurds, worsened the Monarchy’s
25
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legitimacy, specifically in the northern part of Iraq. The Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts were
perhaps inevitable consequences of British rule in the early days of Iraq.
5.2.2 Colonial Experiences and the Creation of Military Capabilities
Colonial rule set a basis for the modern military in Iraq. The Iraqi Army was
officially founded in January 1921 and began with a Headquarter Staff of ten Iraqi
officers, but its primary role and substantial structure was decided at the Cairo
Conference in March 1921 (Al-Marashi and Sammy Salama 2008, 20; Metz 1988). In the
beginning, its role was limited. The British limited the Iraqi Army’s function to internal
affairs whose main task was to suppress anti-government and anti-British activities in the
country. In spite of its limited role, the Iraqi Army was trained by the British and
equipped with modern armaments. The first Iraqi Military College opened in 1921 and
the directors and instructors were British. The instructional materials were also British
military training manuals translated into Arabic (Al-Marashi and Sammy Salama 2008,
27). At the college, future Iraqi officers had the chance to learn a modern military system,
mainly the British system.
In addition, the Iraqi people and the indigenous groups had experienced modern
warfare through organized struggle against British rule. As briefly mentioned above, the
announcement of the mandate evoked strong opposition among the Iraqi people. The
Iraqi revolt against the British began in June 1920. It started as peaceful demonstrations,
but soon the revolution turned violent. Not only Sunni tribes in Bagdhad but also Shi’i
tribes in the south and Kurdish tribes in the north opposed the British. Britain responded
with the use of ground forces and air power to put down the rebellion. During the first
week of July there was fierce fighting between the British and the rebels. Churchill told
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the Cabinet on 7 July that they successfully attacked the Iraqi rebels with bombs and
machine guns from aeroplanes and ground forces (Omissi 1990, 39). T.E Lawrence,
famously known as the celebrated “Lawrence of Arabia,”26 denounced British oppression
during the revolt in his article written to Sunday Times on 22 August, 1920:
Things have been far worse than we have been told, our administration more
bloody and inefficient than the public knows. It is a disgrace to our imperial
record, and may soon be too inflamed for any ordinary cure. We are today not far
from a disaster…Our government is worse than the old Turkish system. They kept
fourteen thousand local conscripts embodied, and killed a yearly average of two
hundred Arabs in maintaining peace. We keep ninety thousand men, with
aeroplanes, armoured cars, gunboats, and armoured trains. We have killed about
ten thousand Arabs in this rising this summer…The Government in Baghdad had
been hanging Arabs in that town for political offences, which they call
rebellion…How long will we permit millions of pounds, thousands of imperial
troops, and tens of thousands of Arabs to be scarified on behalf of colonial
administration which can benefit nobody but its administrators?27
As it turned out, armed revolt had been costly to the British in both manpower and
money (Metz 1998). The revolt developed into a full-scale battle in which Britain had to
use its ground forces as well as air power to quell an armed resistance from organized
groups. The British government lost 500 troops in suppressing the rebellion and needed
to spend 40 million pounds, which was a high cost for Britain which had been fighting
World War I for four years (Tripp 2007; Holden 2012, 62). The revolt was ultimately put
down after three months. Ironically, Iraqi people were able to experience modern warfare
through the 1920 revolt.
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Another consequence of the revolt was that it militarized indigenous groups. In
her letter written on November 29 1920, Gertrude Bell argued that it would necessary but
must be a difficult task to make the tribes surrender their arms.
We are greatly hampered by the tribal rising which has delayed the work of
handing over to the Arab Govt. Sir Percy, I think rightly, decided that the tribes
must be made to submit to force. In no other way was it possible to make them
surrender their arms or teach them that you mustn't lightly engage in revolution,
even when your holy men tell you to do so ...Without the lesson and without
drawing their teeth by fines of arms (impossible to obtain except by force) we
should have left an impossible task to the Arab Govt.28
As described, although the revolt was put down, the tribes still possessed arms and
tribesmen were strongly engaged with their tribes. In 1922, there was a debate over
universal conscription. The idea behind the plan to build an army based on conscription
was to undermine the tribes’ military strength to resist the government by drafting
tribesmen of fighting age into the state’s military (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008). The
plan was postponed until 1934 when the Conscription Law was introduced. The
enforcement of universal conscription in 1934 brought about strong opposition from Iraqi
tribes, especially Shi’i and Kurdish tribes who opposed a Sunni-dominated government
of the new Iraqi state. Also, even if tribesmen were forced to join an army, their loyalty to
the military was low. In sum, the armed revolt against the British colonial rule resulted in
militarization of the Iraqi tribes who opposed to not only colonialism but also the new
Iraqi government. Military capabilities of oppositionist groups and the existence of
multiple military forces within the territory became one of the bases of armed rebellion in
Iraq.
28

Gertrude Bell was a powerful official of the British administration in Baghdad after the First
World War. Her letters are available at http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks04/0400461h.html
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5.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF IRAQI MILITARY AND ITS CAPABILITY
The capacity of the Iraqi military steadily increased after independence. As a
continuation of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, Britain agreed to assist the development
of the Iraqi military when they left the country. Thus, although Britain withdrew all of its
troops from Iraq by October 1947, British airplanes were still based in Iraq and Britain
continued to supply armaments to Iraq (Schmidt 1991, 4). Joining the Baghdad Pact in
1955 created another opportunity for Iraq to advance its military equipment. The pact
reaffirmed Iraq’s close ties to the West. Iraq was backed by not only Britain but also by
another Super Power, the United States. Yet, when an anti-Western and anti-imperialist
regime came to power as a result of the Iraqi Revolution in 1958, the Soviet Union
substituted for the Western countries. With external support from the super powers, the
Iraqi military forces gradually expanded.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Iraqi military underwent quantitative and qualitative
changes in its size and structure. Increase in revenues from the oil industry and the
regime’s consolidation of power allowed the Baath party to expand the military. The
increased defense budget enabled the regime to equip the military with advanced
technology and to enlarge the size of the armed forces. The size of military forces also
increased. The Increase in the defense budget financed universal conscription. The
military forces were expanded from 80,000 to 100,000 between 1968 and 1973 and then
over 2,000,000 by 1978 (Schmidt 1991, 7, originally cited in Nyrop 1985, 239). This was
the fastest and largest expansion in the Arab world during these years (Al-Marashi and
Salama 2008, 123). The regime also created an ideological paramilitary unit, the People’s
Army. (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008). Formed on February 8, 1970, it grew rapidly, and
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by 1977, around 50,000 active members served the People’s Army (Metz 1998). A
restructuring of the army occurred at this time as well. The regime constructed a dual
structure of the army, creating a regular army and the Republican Guard. The Republican
Guard was developed into a fully-fledged corps with advanced weapons, then further
expanded into two corps stationed in the north and the south of Iraq (Jabar 2003, 117).
The diversification of suppliers of military equipment also contributed to Iraq’s
military advance. The Soviet Union was still Iraq’s primary supplier of military
equipment throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Especially, after signing a Friendship Treaty
with the Soviet Union in 1972, more weapons and armaments were delivered to Iraq. At
the same time, however, Iraq did not rely solely on the Soviet Union anymore. The Baath
regime tried to diversify its arms trading partners and started importing weapons from the
Western countries such as France, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. France, in
particular, was the second largest country who exported various armaments to Iraq.29 The
influx of Western armaments and technology helped modernize the military of Iraq.
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 display the trend in military expenditures and the increased
size of Iraqi armed forces over time. The figures show a steady increase in both the
expenditure and the military forces during the 1960s, and a rapid development in the
1970s and 1980s. A drastic change during the 1980s was attributed to the Iraq-Iran War
of 1980, yet the war certainly led Iraq to devote more efforts and resources to strengthen
its military.
In conclusion, since its independence, there had been steady advances in the Iraqi
military both quantitatively and qualitatively. As the fastest growing and the most
advanced institution of the Iraqi state, Iraqi regimes had enough military capabilities to
29
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Figure 5.1 Trends in Iraqi Military Spending

Figure 5.2 Iraqi Armed Forces Expansion
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put down its internal insurgences. Throughout the expansion of the army, a Kurdish
rebellion had been the most serious threat to the security of Iraqi regimes.
Understandably, it could be beneficial for the regimes to conduct a large-scale military
operation to quell the Kurds as soon as possible. This is why there had been constant
militarized confrontation between the two parties. However, as presented previously, the
responses of the Iraqi regimes differed in each phase, resulting in distinctive
consequences in terms of severity and its final results. Relative differences in the military
capabilities and the size at different time periods could partly explain such differences,
but it does not explain the whole. As a security policy decision, the regime had to
consider its internal and external political environments when such insurgences occurred.
That is, the different domestic, regional, and international circumstances in which each
regime was situated led them to make different policy decisions in regards to the Kurdish
problem.
5.4 INTERNAL-EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT: DOMESTIC, REGIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL
DIMENSIONS OF STATE SECURITY
The domestic dimension is discussed based on three critical junctures in Iraqi
modern history and taken into consideration the different levels of instability in domestic
politics over three decades. The three phases of Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts coincide with
three critical junctures in Iraq’s domestic politics: the 1958 Iraqi Revolution, the 1968
military coup d’état and the emergence of the Baath regime, and the emergence of
Saddam Hussein’s totalitarian regime in 1979. Each event separates certain time periods
that had distinctive features in domestic politics. The 1960s in Iraq can be defined as a
transitional period that witnessed the reoccurrence of military coups. Military regimes did
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not stay in power long and were soon overthrown by another military coup. The 1968
coup by the Baath regime initiated civilian rule in Iraq, but the regime suffered from a
lack of legitimacy and a base of support in its early days. The 1970s was the period of
one-party rule by the Baath regime. The Baath regime consolidated its power during this
time and was the sole ruling. As Saddam Hussein emerged as a powerful force in the
party and became President of Iraq in 1979, the regime turned into a personalized
totalitarian regime. Accompanied by the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the political
environment of Iraq was completely changed in the 1980s.
The regional dimension is mainly dealt with based on the rivalry between Iraq and
Iran. The hostile relationship between the two countries created constant tension in the
Gulf region, and it heavily influenced Iraq’s policy decisions. The overthrow of the
Iranian monarchy by the Iranian Revolution in 1979 brought about an especially great
tension between the two countries. Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006)’s study on
international rivalry provides a useful theoretical basis for analyzing Iran and Iraq’s
relationship.
Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) regard rivalries as possessing four dimensions.
The first dimension of rivalries is spatial consistency that revolves around the character
and number of actors. Actors in rivalries are states and they are dyadic. A second
dimension is their duration. This includes both longer (enduring rivalries) and shorterterm rivalries. A third dimension is the severity of the competition. Rivalry relationship is
a particular subset of ‘international relations.’ This leads them to focus on militarized and
conflictual relations in particular. When states are rivals, they compete over conflicting
goals and tangible or intangible goods. Klein, Goertz, and Diehl limit their research to
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competitions that take a military turn. The fourth dimension is linked conflict, referring to
conflicts that are related by space and time. Two conceptual links exist between disputes:
the ‘pull of past’ and ‘expectations of future conflict.’ This means that the initial
interactions in a rivalry influence present and future behaviors and confrontations. Also,
the expectations of mutual disputes, crises, and war in the future condition current policy
choices (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006, 332-335).
The relationship between Iraq and Iran features all of these four components.
They are a pair of states. They have engaged in militarized disputes since their early
statehood. As I will present in detail in the later sections, conflicts between the two
countries were related to one another, and the regimes in power made policy decisions
based on their experiences and expectations. Accordingly, in Klein, Goertz, and Diehl
(2006)’s rivalry dataset, Iraq and Iran are identified as enduring rivals. According to their
dataset, Iraqi-Iranian rivalry continued for sixty-five years, from 1934 to1999. During
this period, the two countries engaged in militarized disputes twenty-six times.30 With
one exception, all were dyadic disputes.31
The Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) dataset contains useful indicators that
measure the levels of hostility between states. Except for one dispute in 1961 when there
was only the threat to use force, Iran and Iraq used their military forces to confront each
other. However, measure of the fatality rate, duration, and highest actions varied in each
decade.
Table 5.2 displays descriptive analyses of militarized disputes between Iraq and
Iran. During a transitional period between the first military regime in 1958 and the early
30
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Table 5.2 Militarized Disputes between Iraq and Iran

A
transitional
Period

The Baath
rule

Personalized
authoritarian
rule by
Saddam
Hussein

Year

Fatality
1-25 deaths

Duration
(Days)
122

Highest
Action
Attack

Hostility
Level
Use of force

1959
1961

None

73

1965
1966
1969
(April)
1969
(September)
1970
1971
(April)
1971
(November)
1973

1-25 deaths
None
None

26
1
69

Show of
force
Clash
Attack
Attack

Display of
force
Use of force
Use of force
Use of force

26-100
deaths
None
1-25 deaths

1

Clash

Use of force

17
48

Seizure
Clash

Use of force
Use of force

1-25 deaths

187

Clash

Use of force

26-100
deaths
26-100
deaths
101-250
deaths
None

61

Clash

Use of force

118

Clash

Use of force

213

Clash

Use of force

113

Attack

Use of force

26-100
deaths
More than
999 deaths

176

Clash

Use of force

2916

Begin
interstate
war

War

1974
(January)
1974
(August)
1979
(February)
1979
(October)
1980

Source: Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) Dataset Version 4.1.

stage of the Baath party rule (1958-1970), there were seven militarized disputes. Except
the September 1969 dispute, the fatality level was low: there were no fatalities or less
than twenty-five deaths. Duration was also shorter compared to the other time periods as
the average duration of conflicts was about forty-four days. The longest duration was 122
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days in 1959, but the fatality rate was low and it did not develop into an armed clash. The
highest actions in disputes were also mixed because only two of them developed into
armed clashes. Under the consolidated Baath party rule in the 1970s, the relationship
between the two turned into more hostile one. Except for the February 1970 dispute,
confrontations resulting in armed clashes were more frequent and the death toll was
higher. The average duration of disputes was about 131 days, which was much longer
than in the transitional period. Lastly, the hostility between the two countries reached its
apex in 1980 when the Iran-Iraq War broke out. The conflict, which continued until 1988,
resulted in enormous losses and damage to both states. Different features of disputes,
especially regarding their severity reflect the changes in the levels of hostility between
Iraq and Iran. Increasing hostility suggests that competition between the two increased
over time.
The international dimension is discussed based on the changes in the relationship
with the Soviet Union. Since the establishment of the republic in 1958, the Soviet Union
was the primary arms supplier of Iraq. Until the early 1970s, Iraq relied almost solely on
the Soviet Union for military imports. Yet, Iraq’s policy of diversification of arms
providers, which followed from enormous oil wealth and the Baath regime’s
consolidation of power in internal politics, reduced Iraq’s reliance on the Soviet Union.
These changes in the importance of the Soviet Union in Iraq’s foreign relations had a
certain impact on its domestic as well as foreign policy decisions.
I argue that these political events as well as the different internal and external
political landscapes surrounding Iraq influenced Iraq’s domestic and foreign policies. In
particular, Iraq’s policy toward the Kurdish rebellion was heavily influenced by such
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changes because of its multinational nature. This resulted in different developments in the
three phases of Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts. The following sections will analyze in detail the
political environment in which Iraqi regimes were situated and the impact of the political
environment on the regimes’ policy decision toward the Kurds.
5.5 THE 1961-1970 CONFLICT
5.5.1 Domestic Dimension
Domestic politics of Iraq in the 1960s can be described as a turbulent period and a
time of confusion. On July 14, 1958, the Hashemite monarchy was abolished by a
military coup executed by Brigadier Abd al Karim Qasim and Colonel Abd as Salaam
Arif, and a new republic was established. Although the 1958 Revolution was universally
welcomed by Iraqi people who had great hope and optimism for their new government, it
brought a decade of instability and military dictatorship (Marr 2004; Farouk-Lsuglett and
Sluglett 2001).
After the revolution, there were seven military coups until 1970, three successful
coup attempts and four unsuccessful coup attempts (Powell and Thyne 2011). Even if the
coup was successful, a ruling group was not able to keep their power for long, and was
soon overthrown by another group. The first regime after the revolution led by Abd alKarim Qasim was threatened by an ongoing confrontation between the Communists and
the Baathists, and was overthrown by the Baath party on 8 February 1963 (Al-arashi and
Salama 2008, 85). In November of the same year, another coup occurred and ousted the
short-lived Baath party from power. The Baath party seized power again after its second
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successful coup in 1968. Table 5.3 briefly summarizes military coups and coup attempts
since the Iraqi Revolution.
Table 5.3 Military Coup Attempts between 1958–1970
Executed By

Verification of
attempt
Successful

July 14, 1958
(Revolution)
March 7, 1959

Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim and Colonel
Abd al-Salam Arif
Colonel Abd al-Wahhab Shawwaf

February 8, 1963

Successful

November 18, 1963

Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr (The head of the Baath
Party’s Military Bureau) and Abd al-Salam
Arif
Abd al-Salam Arif

September 16, 1965

Brigadier Arif Abd al-Razzaq

Unsuccessful

June 30, 1966

Arif Abd al-Razzaq

Unsuccessful

July 17, 1968

The Baath military group

Successful

January 20, 1970

Colonel Salih Mahdi al-Samarrai

Unsuccessful

Unsuccessful

Successful

Source: Powell and Thyne (2011) Military coup dataset32; Al-Marashi and Salama (2008)

As a newly established state, Iraq needed to achieve its territorial and political
integration as soon as possible. The Kurdish problem was one of the most threatening
factors to the regimes’ efforts for consolidation and the state’s security. Having different
ethnicity and language, and a unique culture and history, the Iraqi Kurds kept pursuing
their independent state. Especially when the new Iraqi state was first established, the
Kurds dreamt about the creation of a Kurdish state, one like other new states in the
region. As seen in the previous section, the first step was the Treaty of Sèvres, which was
signed on August 19, 1920 and had provided a promise for the creation of a Kurdish
32
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state. However, the Treaty of Lausanne between Turkey and the allied powers in 1923
invalidated this promise, which led leaders of the Kurdish people to organize movements
for independence. These movements developed into violent conflicts against a central
government.
Recurring provocations by the Kurds in the northern territory required Iraq’s
ruling regime to create consistent policies toward the Kurds. Yet, continued instability in
internal politics in the 1960s made it difficult for the ruling regimes to do so. The regimes
suffered from a lack of consolidated power and legitimacy, and, therefore, they needed
internal support. For a new regime, stabilizing internal politics became the first priority,
so this led the new regime to avoid a military solution to the Kurds and so they made a
cease-fire agreement. However, because of a lack of consistency in their politics in
relation to the Kurdish problem, the agreement was often unfulfilled and conflict was
resumed. This explains why conflict between the Iraqi government and the Kurds
continued intermittently in the 1960s.
Cease-fire agreements and attempts to reach a compromise that followed after
every regime change supports the above idea as well. When Qasim came to power after
the overthrow of the monarchy, the Kurds demanded administrative autonomy. Although
Qasim rejected their demand, he granted extensive concessions to the Kurds during the
first two years of his rule (Bengio 2012, 16). Similarly, when the first Baath regime came
to power in 1963, the Kurds attempted to gain autonomy in Kurdish populated areas in
the northern part of Iraq again: the provinces of Erbil, Sulaymaniyya, Kurkuk, and the
districts and subdistricts in Kiyala and Mosul (Bengio 2012). Similarly, when Arif seized
power, a cease-fire was announced. Finally, when the Baath party came to power for the
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second time in 1968, the regime concluded a long running battle with the Kurds by
offering a new autonomy plan for the Kurds. Learning from previous failures, the Baath
government sought a conciliatory policy toward the Kurds in the early years (Shemesh
1992). As a result, the March Agreement was declared on 11 March 1970, which was the
only agreed-upon statement of Kurdish autonomy acceptable to both Iraq and the Kurds
(1996). From these recurring patterns in the Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts, it can be assumed
that the turbulence of Iraq’s domestic politics in the 1960s was responsible for a
frustrating resolution of the conflicts and influencing the regimes’ decisions on ceasefire
agreements.
5.5.2 Regional Dimension
Before the 1958 Revolution, Iran and Iraq shared common features. Both
countries were monarchies and pro-Western. Monarchical Iraq still maintained a close
relationship with Britain, and was dependent on the West for its defense. Joining the
Baghdad Pact in 1955 openly brought the two countries into a Western regional security
alliance and it created a friendly atmosphere in their bilateral relations (Marr 2001, 189;
Milani 2006). The period of Iran-Iraq cooperation did not last long, however, for the
1958 revolution in Iraq introduced tension in Iraqi-Iranian relations.
The 1958 revolution in Iraq had a huge impact on its bilateral relationship with
Iran. A year later, Iraq ceased its participation in the Baghdad Pact in 1959, and turned to
the Soviet Union as a substitute for Britain and the United States (Marr 2001). A series of
confrontations between the two after the revolution the reflects tension between Iraq and
Iran after the establishment of a new republic in the Gulf region
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However, during the 1960s, both countries acted cautiously (Bakhashi, 2004, 16).
Only low-level incidents and clashes occurred on the joint frontier as Table 5.2 displays.
Also, the issue was limited to territorial disputes – the control of and access to the Shatt
al-Arab waterway (Abdulghani 1984). Although Iraq and Iran competed for their national
interests in this period, neither state openly displayed ambition for regional power in the
Gulf at this time. The primary interest of Iraq’s military regimes in this period was to
consolidate their power in domestic politics and, thus, foreign relations were of secondary
importance. In addition, the shah of Iran was not involved in inter-Arab politics at this
time. In these circumstances, the possibility of intense competition for regional
hegemony between the two Gulf States was very low (Bakhashi 2004).
Rather, the two countries made an effort to ease the tension over the Shatt issue
and improve their relationship in general. High-level visits and negotiations occurred in
the later 1960s, and it led to the first official visit by an Iraqi president since 1958
revolution. President Abdul-Rahman Arif of Iraq visited Iran on 14 March 1967, and the
shah warmly hosted him (Bakhashi 2004, 17). Returning to Iraq, President Arif stated
that he had “found full response from the Shah and good feelings toward us. He (the
Shah) wishes peace and stability to Iraq.”33 In return, Iran’s Prime Minister Tahir Yahya
visited Iraq in June 1968. On this visit, Iraq and Iran agreed to form mixed commissions
for the Shatt issue, and to report their findings in order that decisions might be taken on
them (Abdulghani 1984, 21). Again, maintaining a good relationship with Iran was
necessary for Iraqi regimes that had no consolidated power status internally. Indeed, Iraq
was hoping to have friendly relations with its neighboring states of Turkey and Iran so
33
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that it could devote itself to the main task.34 The lack of hostility between the two
countries had an impact on the triangular relationship between Iraq, Iran, and the Iraqi
Kurds.
The Iraqi Kurdish issue has been a consistently useful tool for Iran. Whenever the
relationship deteriorated, Iran incited the Kurds more often as a means to destabilize the
Iraqi government and to extract concessions over a conflicting goal (Abdulghani 1984).
Yet the relaxed relationship between the two and the absence of power struggles in the
Gulf region made the Iraqi Kurds less useful to Iran. Accordingly, the intervention of Iran
in Iraqi affairs using Kurdish issue was limited in the 1960s. Therefore, it can be argued
that limited intervention from the rival country, that is Iran, led the Iraqi regime to
conduct minor military operations that were often concluded in compromise.
In fact, there is no official data on how much aid from Iran flowed to the Iraqi
Kurds in this period. Yet, US government documents reveal that Iranians provided only
limited aid to Iraqi Kurds in the early and mid-1960s. A Memorandum from the Special
Group meeting in the Department of State in May 1963 states, “the Shah is giving some
aid and comfort to the Kurds but that material assistance is not significant.”35 This
tendency did not change in the late 1960s either. On August 19, 1966, The US embassy
in Iraq reported to the Department of State that Iran gave limited help to the Kurds for
limited objectives.36 Iran’s limited policy toward the Iraqi Kurds damaged the
relationship between Iran and the Iraqi Kurds and created distrust between the two.
According to the note from the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research on
34
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September 1, 1967, the Iraqi Kurds distrusted the new Prime Minister of Iran, Tahir
Yahya, because they felt that he played them false in earlier dealings. The appointment of
Abd al-Fattah al-Shali as the new Kurdish minister in the Cabinet deepened the Kurds’
distrust since the new Kurdish minister was soft on Barzani’s rival faction of Jalal
Talabni. The note concludes that the Iranian government was pursuing a slow and
delicate rapprochement with Iraq.37
The pressure from the US would also affect Iran’s limited support toward and
involvement in the Kurdish insurgency in Iraq. In the 1960s, the US government adhered
to the position of not intervening in the Kurdish problem.38 The US considered the
Kurdish problem in Iraq as a domestic issue and therefore, foreign countries should not
interfere in the problem. Yet, at the same time, the US did not want to see the
establishment of an independent Kurdish state in Iraq because it could invite the Soviet
Union’s presence in the Gulf region. The US hoped to see compromise between Iraq and
the Kurds as soon as possible. A Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary
of Defense, Robert McNamara, in August 1963 reveals the US position on the Iraqi
Kurdish issue:
As a long term goal, the US should continue efforts to promote assimilation of the
Kurds within national boundaries, and granting of a measure of local selfgovernment in predominately Kurdish regions. However, prolongation of the
conflict in Iraq engenders instability, and provides an opportunity for communist
exploitation of the Kurdish problem in Iraq and in neighboring countries. A firm
Iraqi military position, coupled with a willingness to accommodate to legitimate
Kurdish grievances, appears to be the most promising avenue for an early end to
hostilities and advancement of internal stability in Iraq. To this end, the US
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should give favorable consideration to reasonable Iraqi requests for equipment
and seek to use resultant influence to urge moderation on the Iraqi government.39
As presented, prolongation of the conflict with the Kurds was not in the US’s
interest at all. Thus, the US government warned Iran several times not to intervene in
Iraqi affairs and to keep their hands off.40 As the US was Iran’s biggest ally since World
War II, Iranian leaders actively cultivated the relationship with the US to protect their
country from political pressure from the Soviet Union (Metz 1987). For instance, in his
meeting with President Eisenhower, the shah emphasized the geopolitical and strategic
importance of Iran as a gateway, saying “if you control Iran, you control the Middle
East.”41 In these circumstances, the shah would not be able to conduct policies that cross
the US position, including the Iraqi Kurds issue.
Another reason for limited intervention and support of the Kurds by Iran was the
possibility of an uprising among Iranian Kurds who were affected by news of the
successful activities of Iraqi Kurds. In fact, the Iranian Kurds were indeed influenced by
the development of the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq. The US Embassy in Iran reported in
1966 that there was increasing activity among the Iranian Kurds after reaching the
negotiated settlement of the Kurdish revolt in Iraq. According to the ambassador to Iran,
the expectation that the Iraqi Kurds would gain certain advantages and privileges from
their acceptance of the cease-fire set in motion a latent nationalist fervor among the
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Iranian Kurdish group.42 Thus, the shah feared that a successful Kurdish rebellion in Iraq
might have a spill-over effect on Iranian Kurds (Abdulghani 1984). This led the shah to
hesitate to fully support the Kurdish revolt in Iraq.
In sum, it is true that Iran provided aid to the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq, yet it was
limited and Iranian intervention was minimal in this period. It can be argued that this
rendered the issue relatively less urgent for the Iraqi regime and led the Iraqi regimes to
conduct minor military operations. This is why the severity of conflict was low and
conflicts often ended in compromise during the 1960s.
5.5.3 International Dimension
In the early years of its statehood, Iraq was a pro-Western country. The
monarchical Iraq was still dependent on Britain and the West while there was almost no
relationship with the Soviet Union. Iraq even severed its diplomatic relationship with the
Soviets in January 1955 (Shemesh 1992, 1). When the monarchy was overthrown by a
military coup led by ‘Abd-al-Karim Qasim however, Iraq’s foreign relations completely
changed. As soon as Qasim seized power, he restored diplomatic ties with the Soviet
Union in order to reduce Iraq’s dependence on Britain. In response, as it did for Egypt,
the Soviet Union extended economic and military assistance to Iraq (Shemesh 1992).
Except when the first Baath regime was overthrown on 18 November 1963, the
relationship between Iraq and the Soviet Union was amicable during the late 1950s and
1960s.43 For Iraqi regimes in these time periods, economic and military assistance and
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political support from the Soviet Union were essential for its survival. Accordingly, its
internal policies, as well as foreign policies, were highly influenced by the Soviet’s
opinion. Regarding the Kurdish problem, the Soviets had sympathy toward the Kurdish
rebellion and took a moderate position. They valued the Kurdish rebels because they
shared the Iraqi Communists’ goal of establishing a coalition regime in Baghdad
(Shemesh 1992, 14). Thus, the Kurds were considered as a mean to promote the interests
of the Soviet’s “internal ally,” the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP).
During the first three years of its rule, the Qasim regime was hostile towards the
Kurds. The Soviets protested against Qasim’s stance on Iraqi Communists and the Kurds,
and from the end of 1960, the Soviet media began to publish critical comments about
Qasim’s policies.44 For instance, the first secretary of the Iraqi Communist Party, Salam
Adil criticized Qasim’s regime openly at the 22nd Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU) congress in October 1961.45 He argued that “the national oppression of the Kurds
should be ended at once and they should be granted self-government within the
framework of the Iraqi Republic.” At the end of his speech, he stressed “the importance
of common struggle,” and said that it should be based on the demand for recognition of
the national rights of the Kurds and their right to self-government.46 The fact that the
CPSU authorities authorized everything said at the CPSU Congress beforehand tells us
that the Soviets opposed harsh treatment of the Kurds and they supported Kurdish
autonomy. The Soviets’ stance did not change during the course of the conflict. On 13
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January 1965, Pravda47 published the article about the Soviet Union’s opposition to a
military solution to the Kurds:
The Soviet Public has always been and is against unjust wars, such as the bloody
anti-Kurdish venture has been and for a peaceful and democratic settlement of the
problem in the interest of the problem in the interests of both Arabs and Kurds.48
Moreover, a series of articles published in Pravda in September 1968 expressed open
sympathy for the “struggle of the Kurds to assure their rights within the framework of a
united state with the Arabs. ” It concluded that the Kurdish question must be solved by
peaceful means (Shemesh 1992, 22). Accordingly, whenever Iraq and the Kurds reached
a compromise to end confrontation, the Soviets welcomed it. Sometimes arms supply
followed a cease-fire as a reward. For instance, when the Abd al-Salam Arif regime and
the Kurds signed a cease-fire in February 1964, Abd al-Rahman Arif, the Iraqi Chief of
General Staff and President Arif’s brother, told Baghdad News that the Soviet Union had
agreed to supply arms to Iraq (Ro’i 1974, 403).
Moscow’s stance on the Kurdish issue and Iraq’s reliance on the Soviet Union
explains part of the story about why the conflicts in the 1960s were not as fierce as later
conflicts in the 1970s and 1980s. It also explains why Iraq did not or could not put down
the Kurdish insurgency harshly and why the conflicts were often concluded with a
stalemate or a ceasefire agreement.
The 1970 March Agreement that ended the 10 year-long conflicts between Iraq
and the Kurds was possible in these circumstances. As President al-Bakr proclaimed in
1968, the Soviet Union occupied the first place in the Second Baath Party’s foreign
47
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policy (Shemesh 1992, 24).49 In fact, the Soviet Union was the only superpower that Iraq
could rely on. Iraq severed its diplomatic relationship with the United States after the
Third Arab-Israeli War in 1967. Another superpower, Britain, was planning to leave the
region, evacuating its military and other key administrative departments. In addition, the
Soviet Union was Iraq’s major arms supplier whereas arms imports from the West and
other countries were insignificant. Under the conflictual circumstances, arms supplies
from the Soviet Union were essential to the Baath regime. Moreover, the Soviets
persuaded the Baath regime to halt the offensive against the Kurds (Shemesh 1992). In
order to seek Soviet support, the Baath regime needed to show their intention of solving
the Kurdish issue peacefully. Under these circumstances, it seems true that Iraq was not
able to conduct foreign policies that would upset the Soviet Union, and that made Iraq
take moderate policies toward the Kurds.
5.6 THE 1974-1975 CONFLICT
5.6.1 Domestic Dimension
Iraq’s domestic politics in the late 1960s and early 1970s can be described as the
mixture of consolidation of the Baath Party’s authority and the emergence of a strong
leader after the internal power struggle between al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein. After
political chaos caused by several military coup attempts, the Baath Party finally stood up
as a sole authority of Iraq. When constitutional and administrative changes transformed
regime into a quasi-presidential regime through which power was concentrated in the
hands of al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein (Bengio 2012, 28). Saddam was appointed as an
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acting president and the deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC),
which provided him with a platform for becoming a sole leader of Iraq.50 Subsequently,
the domestic political situation began to stabilize, and the regime accelerated the
consolidation of its power. Unlike the previous regimes, the Baath regime was be able to
conduct more consistent policies, including the Kurdish problems.
The power struggle between al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein in the early 1970s and
Saddam’s upper hand on al-Bakr was responsible, in part, for the 1974-1975 episodes.
While al-Bakr did not want to deteriorate the relationship with the Kurds any further and
adopted a cautious stand, Saddam Hussein and his followers adhered to a strong stance
on the Kurdish issue. He revealed his stance in an interview with the New York Times in
1973, that the Baath Party would not concede any of its authority to the Kurds and that no
Kurds would be included in the Revolutionary Command Council.51 As Saddam Hussein
emerged as a strong leader of the Baath regime, the voice of advocating for the use of
violence to the Kurds became stronger.
Saddam strengthened his position further by completing the nationalization of oil
industry on 1 June 1972, which brought massive revenues to Iraq. As Saddam
strengthened his position in the regime, people close to Saddam were placed in topranking positions. On the contrary, al-Bakr and his faction lost their power (Bengio
2012). The military also supported Saddam and his position toward the Kurdish issue.
Saddam’s successful visit to the Soviet Union in February 1972, which concluded in
technical assistance and arms deals, further consolidated his position in the regime. After
his visit, Iraq and the Soviet Union signed the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty on 9
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April 1972. With the strong leadership, in 1973, a year before the 1974-1975 conflict, the
Baath regime seemed more self-confident and wielded more power than ever under the
leadership of Saddam Hussein (Bengio 2012).
On the Eighth Regional Congress held in January 1974, Saddam was recognized
as a de facto leader of Iraq. Saddam’s stance toward the Kurdish problem is reflected in
the political report of the Eighth Congress, Revolutionary Iraq 1968-1973, which he
played a main role in formulating. The report recognized the Kurdish movement as a
legitimate movement, yet it emphasized that it is legitimate “so long as it works within
the framework of national rights for the Kurdish people within the Republic of Iraq.”52
Also, it emphasized the territorial unity of the Iraq state several times:
The Kurdish question has been the most difficult problem confronting the Party
and the Revolution in past years…The party had to find a solution…that would
satisfy the national aspirations of our Kurdish masses while protecting the
territorial unity of the land and the unity of the national progressive movement
without conflicting with the aims of the Arab struggle.
As from the report, the regime preferred a federalist solution to the Kurdish problem,
which was not acceptable to the Kurds.
On 11 March 1974, on the fourth anniversary of the March Declaration, the Baath
regime promulgated the Autonomy Law and gave the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
only fourteen days to assent to the law. The KDP rejected the law because only 60
percent of what the KDP considered as Kurdish lands were actually included in the
autonomous region. In addition, the question of oil and mineral rights in KirKuk area was
not clearly resolved by the law (Hannum 1996, 193). The 1974 Autonomy Law was
perceived as a mean to weaken the 1970 March Agreement.
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The fact that the Baath regime arbitrarily proclaimed the autonomy law and
forced the Kurds to concede it reflects that the regime was ready for another military
confrontation with the Kurds. Domestically, the regime solidified its authority with a
strong leader, Saddam Hussein, who took a strong stance on the Kurdish problem. Under
these circumstances, the regime was able to form its strong stance toward the Kurds more
clearly. It contributed to the outbreak of the 1974-1975 conflicts and made the conflict
more severe and intensified compared to the 1961-1970 episodes.
5.6.2 Regional Dimension
The Baath Party during its first few years suffered from isolation abroad,
especially among the Middle Eastern countries. Because of internal instability in its early
times in power, the regime had to put its energy toward stabilizing domestic politics
while showing little interest in its foreign relations (Bengio 2012). The relationship with
Iran, in particular, was the most severe one and it had a huge impact on Iraq’s policy
towards the Kurds.
Iran and Iraq’s competition for regional hegemony began in earnest in the first
years of the Baath regime. It began to be exacerbated in 1968 when Britain declared its
intention to complete the evacuation of its forces from the Gulf region by late 1971
(Bengio 2012, 30). The expected power vacuum after the evacuation of British forces led
to the competition between the two countries. The conflict over the Shatt al-Arab
waterway in 1969 was the starting point of a fierce rivalry between Iraq and Iran. The
hostile relationship between the two countries lasted until the signing of the Algiers
Agreement in 1975, which settled the territorial dispute over the Shatt al-Arab waterway
and brought about a short-lived amicable relationship between the two.
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The political and military vacuum after the British evacuation led to an apparent
competition for regional power between Iraq and Iran. Both countries thought itself as the
guardian of Gulf security. The shah, who did not show political ambition in the Gulf
region, now publicly announced Iran’s role as the sole guardian after Britain. In his
interview with Guardian on 9 October, 1971, he stated that “the Persian Gulf must
always be kept open – under Iranian protection – for the benefit of not only my country
but the other Gulf countries and the world.”53 The shah’s ambitious posture on regional
politics disturbed Iraq. The Baath regime considered itself as protector of Arab
nationalism against the Persian nationalism of Iran and Western imperialism. It accused
Iran of being a puppet country of the West and the defender of Western interests. Iran, on
the other hand, saw the Iraqi Baath regime as a dangerous and radical regime. That is,
Iraqi-Iranian rivalry was the clash between conservative, status quo-oriented monarchic
Iran and the revolutionary, ideological regime of Iraq (Abdulghani 1984, 100).
In addition, Iran’s consolidation of the military superiority in the Gulf region
fueled Iraq’s fear. The influx of oil revenue and the US aids to Iran contributed to Iran’s
military superiority that caused the arms race between Iraq and Iran.54 That is, the rivalry
relationship between two was Iraq’s motive behind a large increase in military budget. It
reflected the competition over regional hegemony and was an indicator of deepening
rivalry relationship between the two.
Since the rivalry manifested, Iran used every means to weaken Iraq domestically
as well as internationally. For Iran, the Kurds were a useful tool to destabilize its’
neighboring rival, which could help Iran avoid direct military confrontation with Iraq.
53
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Although Iran did not admit to its involvement with the Iraqi-Kurdish relationship about
that time, evidence exists. CBS news noted on 1 November 1975 that the House of
Representatives Intelligence Committee had discovered that the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) had shipped ‘millions of dollars worth’ of arms to the Kurdish rebels in
Iraq at the request of the Shah of Iran. It further alleged that when President Nixon visited
Iran in May 1970, the Shah had asked him to supply untraceable arms for the Kurdish
rebels to “help to keep the Iraqi Government off balance,” and tens of millions of dollars
worth of Soviet arms were delivered to Iran for the purpose.55 A Memorandum sent to
Henry Kissinger in June7, 1972 from Harold H. Saunders, the National Security Staff,
also reveals that Iran was indeed supporting the Iraqi Kurds to weaken the Baath regime.
The memorandum contains the fact that the Shah of Iran requested the US to meet
Kurdish representatives of Barzani and support the idea of Iraqi Kurds as a source of
instability in Iraq.56
The frustration of Iran’s involvement in Iraq’s domestic affairs is seen in
Revolutionary Iraq 1968-1973, the political report adopted by the Eighth Regional
Congress of the Baath Party in 1974:
We felt that the leadership (of the Kurdistan Democratic Party) was intensifying
emergency patterns in its dealings with the government and making suspect
relations with foreign powers…The influential separatist, suspect, client and
reactionary elements and tendencies in the leadership of the Kurdistan Democratic
Party were not on the decline to the degree anticipated before and after the March
announcement. These elements committed large scale sabotage and conducted
propaganda activity against the Party and the Revolution at home and abroad…
They are still to this day openly cooperating with the reactionary states and
imperialist forces in the area to weaken and destroy the Party and the Revolution.
These trends and elements are now forming the primary reserve for the forces of
imperialism and regression in Iraq.
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Although it did not mention specific countries with which the Kurdistan Democratic
Party (KDP) was cooperating, Iran was circumstantially providing military and financial
aids to the Iraqi Kurds with help of the U.S. The Kurds and Iran shared the same
objective of destabilizing the Baath regime, and it made the Iraqi Kurds a useful tool for
Iran to do so. In this situation, it can be assumed that it was crucial for the Baath regime
to remove the “internal enemy” by suppressing them harshly. This explains the increased
intensity and severity of the 1974-1975 conflicts.
5.6.3 International Dimension
In the early and mid 1970s, the Soviet Union was still the most important country
in Iraq’s foreign relations. In the period between 1968 and 1975, the Soviet Union still
accounted for over 95 percent of all conventional military transfers to Iraq (Svet 2015,
176). The Friendship and Cooperation Treaty signed on 9 April 1972 was the summit of
the Soviet-Iraqi relationship. Ironically, however, Iraq’s needs for the Soviet Union
started to decline from 1973, and it was the Soviet Union who wanted to continue having
a close tie with Iraq.
There were two main reasons that increased the Soviets’ interests in Iraq. First,
geopolitically, the Persian Gulf became a focus of the Soviets’ global strategy (Ro’i
1974, 564). It was due to the expected power vacuum after the evacuation of British
forces from the Gulf and the increasing Soviets’ interests in the Indian Ocean and subcontinent. Since Britain had declared in 1968 that it was considering evacuating its forces
from the Gulf by 1971, the superpowers, especially the US and the Soviet Union,
intensified their efforts to fill the power vacuum left by Britain. Besides, a close tie
between Iran and the U.S. and worsening of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship in the 1970s
86

increased the importance of tightening the diplomatic relationship with Iraq. Second,
economically, it was considered that importing oil from Iraq was increasingly economical
for the Soviet Union (Ro’i 1974).57
On the other hand, Iraq tried to reduce its dependency on the Soviet Union. The
enhanced stability in domestic affairs and economic wealth from nationalized oil
production helped such efforts. In his interview with the New York Times in July 1973,
Saddam Hussein emphasized that Iraq refuses to be “a political or economic satellite of
anyone, including the Soviet Union.”58 His interview reveals Iraq’s intention to avoid the
Soviets’ involvement in Iraq’s affairs. In Chapter Nine of the Political Report of the
Eighth Congress, Revolutionary Iraq 1968-1973, International Policy, the Baath regime
demonstrated its intention of opening a friendly relationship with the West:
The Western capitalist world is not composed totally of enemies and imperialists.
Some countries take relatively moderate stands toward the Arabs. Some other
countries are not in conflict with us thus making it possible to establish normal
relations with them. Our independent attitudes and the requirements of modern
times call for good relations with all peoples and countries. This can help us to
benefit from their technological and scientific advances and at the same time it
can help strengthen our position internationally.59
Accordingly, Iraq tried to diversify its diplomatic relationships and arms trading
partners. The rise of oil prices also created favorable circumstances for improving Iraq’s
economic and political links with the West (Shemesh 1992, 96). For instance, in 1974,
Iraq restored diplomatic relations with West Germany and Britain. Iraq’s imports from
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Western countries also tremendously increased in this year while imports from the Soviet
Union grew moderately, which meant the portion of the Soviet Union in Iraq’s imports
decreased (Shemesh 1992).
It can be assumed that the decrease of the Soviet’s importance in Iraq’s
diplomatic relations influenced the Baath regime’s policy towards the Kurds and its
military operations of the 1974-1975 Iraq-Kurdish conflicts. The Soviet’s stance on Iraqi
Kurds was less critical at this time. Therefore, Iraqi foreign relations determined less of
Iraq’s decisions regarding the Kurdish problem. Without pressure from the Soviet Union,
who advocated a moderate and peaceful solution, the Baath regime was able to conduct a
heavy military operation on the Kurdish rebels. This explains why the 1974-1975
conflicts could be much more severe and brutal than the previous episodes in the first
phase, and concluded without compromise.
5.7 THE 1985-1988 CONFLICT
5.7.1 Domestic Dimension
A suppression of the Kurdish rebellion and signing of the Algiers Agreement in
1975 further solidified the Baath regime’s authority and the one-party system in Iraq. At
the same time, economic prosperity and the growing revenues from a nationalized oil
industry further enhanced the regime’s power in both domestic and regional politics. The
best time of the Baath party did not last long, however. Power of the state was
increasingly concentrated and accumulated in the hands of one person, Saddam Hussein.
The country became a more personal autocracy since the late 1970s (Marr 2004, 180).
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After the successful military campaign against the Kurds and the conclusion of
the Algiers Agreement with Iran in 1975, Saddam Hussein’s position in the Baath party
strengthened. By concluding these events, Saddam made it possible for the Baath to
extend its control over the entire country. It consolidated his position as a de facto leader
in the party. On July 17, 1979, Saddam Hussein officially became President of Iraq when
Al-Bakr resigned from his post. Hussein also served as secretary-general of the Baath
Party Regional Command, chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, and
commander-in-chief of the military.
Although he became officially the head of Iraq in 1979, the process of
consolidation of power to Saddam Hussein was already under way. It took place in two
areas: an administrative sector and a security sector. In the administrative aspect, the
most significant event was the absorption of the Baath Regional Command into the
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) in September 1977. All members of the
Regional Command were appointed as members of the RCC, which made these two
bodies indistinguishable. Since the Regional Command was the core of party leadership
and the top decision-making body of the Iraqi Baath Party, it signified the end of the
Baath party as an independent body (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 2001, 207-208; Metz
1988). It degraded to a symbolic institution that asserted the authority of Saddam
Hussein.
In the security sector, various internal security apparatuses were developed to
protect Saddam Hussein and to closely monitor a plot and anti-opposition activities
against him. In order to eradicate remaining power of al-Bakr, Saddam Hussein
dismantled the old guard within the security organizations, and created new bodies from
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the bottom up (Baram 2003, 99). The Special Security Organization (SSO), established in
1982, was the most important security body in Iraq. Its main responsibility was to protect
the president. Another presidential protection force was the Himaya. General Security
and Military Intelligence monitored Iraq’s military for signs of dissent.60 They were also
involved in monitoring, arresting, and torturing civilians who were against Saddam
Hussein’s regime. The Republican Guard was responsible for protecting Baghdad,
stationing outside the city. It was supposed to protect the city from an external attack, but
it protected the president against the regular army. The Special Republican Guard was a
well-trained force that was allowed into Baghdad and provided security for the president
(Baram 2003). The creation and development of the People’s Army also became one of
the foundations of Saddam’s rule.61 The aim of building the People’s Army as an ‘antiarmy’ was to neutralize the regular army’s potential as a source of opposition to Saddam
(Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 2001, 207). The Tikritis, and especially members of
Saddam Hussein’s tribe, the Albu-Nasir, occupied most of the key positions in these
security forces and institutions, which gave Saddam Hussein more security.
The decision to launch a brutal attack against the Kurds between 1985 and 1989
could be made under these domestic circumstances. As discussed in the previous section,
Saddam Hussein took a strong stance on the Kurdish problem and insisted for a military
solution. And in fact, it was Saddam who decided on the use of chemical weapons
(Bengio 2012, 180). Without any obstacles in his decision making process, he
presumably was able to command genocidal attacks against the Kurds.
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5.7.2 Regional Dimension
It was expected that the Algiers Agreement between Iran and Iraq in 1975 would
bring peace to the Gulf region. The two countries made further progress in their
relationship after signing the agreement. The Iranian Prime Minster, Abbas Hoveida,
visited Iraq from 26 to 29 March 1975, and a joint communiqué was issued on 29 March.
According to Reuters, it outlined political issues, trade and economic relations, and ease
of access to each other’s country.62 In return, Saddam Hussein visited Iran in May of the
same year. In a joint statement, both states affirmed their “firm determination” to
continue with the full implementation of the Algiers Agreement.63 President al-Bakr’s
speech on 17 July, 1975 further raised expectations about regional peace. He described
the Iraq-Iran agreement as “one of our most important achievements in the field of
foreign relations” and claimed that it had “the deepest positive effect on the Arab Gulf
area.”64
However, these positive expectations completely collapsed when the Iranian
Revolution occurred in 1979. The Shah of Iran was ousted from power, and Ayatollah
Khomeini established the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has been the most conservative
Shi’i regime in the Middle East. The balance of power between Iraq and Iran collapsed.
The establishment of the radical Shi’i country in neighboring countries became a real
threat to Iraq and a fiercer rivalry for regional power between the two countries began
again.
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The Iran-Iraq war was the climax of rivalry between the two countries. It was
obvious that the winner of the war could be a leader of the region. Thus, the two
countries used every possible way to win the war. Iran, again, used the Kurds to
destabilize Saddam’s regime. For minorities and opposition groups in Iraq, too, the IranIraq war was an opportunity to secure their rights to state power, and possibly overthrow
the Iraqi regime. Particularly, for the Iraqi Kurds, the external warfare of the regime gave
them another chance to fight for independence. Having militarized organizations and
experienced leaders, they knew how to conduct anti-governmental warfare. In fact,
among minority groups, only the Kurdish group developed the popular uprising into a
military confrontation with the Saddam’s regime.
Iran and the Kurds often carried joint attacks on Iraq. During the war, Iran
invaded northern Iraq with assistance from the Kurds. The Kurds, too, launched an
offensive against Iraq with the help of Iran. The joint attempts of Iran and the Kurds were
a serious problem for Iraq since it could divert the Iraqi Army’s attention away from the
main battle zone. It made the Kurdish problem more serious than any other time. Thus, it
would be urgent for Iraq to remove the Kurdish threat as soon and efficiently as possible.
It explains why Iraq launched a chemical attack on Halabja shortly after the joint forces
of Iran and the Kurds had succeeded in expelling the Iraqi forces from Halabja and
occupying it (Bengio 2012). Therefore, it can be argued that serious security threats from
the Kurds’ joint action with Iran led Iraq to conduct a cruel military campaign against the
Kurds. It is because further advances of the joint Iranian-Kurdish forces did not only
threaten the regime’s survival but also put placed the power status of Iraq in the Gulf
region in danger.
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5.7.3 International Dimension
The influence and role of the Soviet Union was considerably reduced from the
late 1970s as the Baath regime and Saddam Hussein put more energy to diversify Iraq’s
foreign relations. They started to set up economic and military relationships with the
West.65 They also tried to improve the relationship with the Arab state. In the interview
of with the Cairo Daily Al-Ahram published on 21 and 22 February 1975, Saddam
Hussein said, “We are ready to discuss the establishment of a joint defence plan with
Saudi Arabia, including the formation of a joint navy.” Saddam also mentioned in the
interview with the Washington Post on 25 April, 1975 that “Iraq would soon consult Iran
and other Gulf states on the possibility of establishing ‘security structures’ to replace
foreign military alliances.66 President al-Bakr’s speech on 17 July 1975 also reveals the
regime’s willingness to expand its diplomatic ties with the Arab countries.67
Indeed, the regime made progress in breaking its diplomatic isolation. Iraq
concluded a series of economic and border agreements with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and
Kuwait.68 Also, Iraq improved relations with the Western countries. For instance,
Saddam Hussein visited France in September 1975 to discuss the nuclear technology and
development contracts. As the London Times reported, Iraq had sought French
technological assistance for the development of a nuclear energy program. Iraq expected
France to build an experimental nuclear power station in Iraq and to give training to Iraqi
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scientists and technicians. A summit meeting between the two countries led to a
framework of a nuclear co-operation agreement, which was expected to be signed in
October.69 Iraq also allowed Western governments and companies to invest in Iraq. 70
The regime even expressed its willingness to restore diplomatic relations with the
U.S. In the interview with the Cairo Daily Al-Ahram, Saddam Hussein mentioned that “if
the U.S.A wishes to establish new relation with us on the basis of joint interest and noninterference in our affairs, it will find the doors wide open.” In fact, the commercial
relationship between Iraq and the U.S. grew quickly. The International Herald Tribune
reported on 11 April 1975 that US-Iraqi trade had jumped from less than $20 million a
year to nearly $300 million a year. It further quoted words from a diplomat in Baghdad
that Iraq was ‘just waiting for the right time’ to announce a resumption of diplomatic
relations with the USA.71 As Iraq had become the fastest-growing market for American
goods in the Middle East, the direct investment of American firms in Iraq also
increased.72
On the other hand, although Saddam emphasized the importance of the alliance
with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in his interview with the Cairo Daily
Al-Ahram published in February 1975, the Soviet’s influence in Iraq was clearly waning.
The International Herald Tribune on 11 April 1975 quoted a Western diplomat as saying
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that the Soviet Union had ‘lost their monopoly in everything but the supply of arms,’ to
the extent that ‘virtually every new major project in the past two years has gone to the
West.’73 Although the Soviet Union was still a major supplier of arms, Iraq sought other
routes for importing arms. In his interview with the Washington Post on 25 April 1975,
Saddam said, “Iraq would be prepared to buy arms from countries other than the Soviet
Union.”74 The Soviet Union expressed its discontent, and suspended arms shipments to
Iraq in July 1975.75
As Iraq tried to be less dependent on the Soviet Union by diversifying its foreign
relations, the influence of the Soviet Union began to decline in the late 1970s. In the
1980s, its influence rapidly waned and its role in the Iraq politics was hardly found.
Therefore, it can be assumed Iraq would be able to make policy decisions without
pressure from the Soviets. This explains another aspect why the 1985-1988 military
campaign became the most brutal one in the history of the Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts.
5.8 CONCLUSION
The three phases of the Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts from 1961 to 1988 differ in terms
of their severity, duration, and outcomes. I have tried to compare and analyze how
different opportunities that the Iraqi regimes had in each phase affected Iraq’s policy
towards the Kurds and influenced the course of the conflicts. British colonial rule
provided an initial source of instability and Iraq’s increasing military capabilities created
a possibility of brutal suppression. Yet, the different internal and external political
environments in which each regime was situated led them to make different security
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policy decisions in regards to the Kurdish problem. Specifically, the level of political
instability and consolidation of power in domestic politics, changes in the extent of
hostility between Iraq and Iran in regional politics, and changes in the relationship with
the Soviet Union in international politics brought differences regarding Iraq’s decisions.
These findings support my theoretical arguments over the development of civil conflict
and a state’s decision on internal insurgency. In the next chapter I apply the key findings
from the cases of Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts – the three dimensions of state security – to the
cases of two Arab countries that have experienced so-called “Arab Spring” – Egypt and
Libya – and what made a difference in the state’s response to a popular uprising, resulting
in markedly dissimilar consequences.
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CHAPTER 6.
EMPIRICAL STUDY II: THE 2011 EGYPTIAN UPRISING AND THE
2011 LIBYAN CIVIL CONFLICT
From an in-depth study of the set of Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts, I have delineated
three important factors at play in a state’s security decision making and the course of
conflict: domestic, regional, and international dimensions of a state’s security decisions
on internal affairs. The domestic dimension includes the level of instability in domestic
politics. The regional dimension searches for the extent of a competitive relationship with
a rival country in the region. The international dimension includes the influence of
Superpower countries in a state’s politics. Analyzing Iraq’s decisions in dealing with the
Kurdish problem based on these three aspects over time, I have found that differences in
domestic, regional, and international circumstances affect the state’s security decision
making and the development of conflict.
In this chapter, I apply the key findings from the previous chapter to the two Arab
countries with divergent outcomes in the wake of so-called Arab Spring: Egypt and
Libya. It is not easy to compare these two counties with the Iraqi-Kurds conflict because
of the differences in the nature of uprising and internal and external circumstances.
Unlike the Kurdish rebellion that aimed at establishing the independent Kurdish state, a
main goal of the Arab uprising in most countries was democratization and liberalization
of the states. In addition, as many scholars have pointed out, the role of technology was
vital in the spread and the development of uprising. Also, intense competition between
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Superpowers in third world countries have decreased since the end of the Cold War,
which also affected the rivalry relationships between countries in many regions as well.
Additionally, because the 2011 uprising is a relatively new and ongoing event, it is
difficult to find clear evidence.
Nevertheless, it is worth studying the Arab uprising in terms of the framework of
a state’s security decision-making outlined in the present study. The Arab Spring was a
unique and unexpected political event that swept over the Middle East and North Africa
in a short period of time. Scholars have been trying to explain why and how such a
phenomenon simultaneously happened in many authoritarian states in the region. Most
studies only focus on domestic circumstances, such as economic hardship and political
inequality, for explanations. While those conditions certainly played a pivotal role in the
occurrence of the 2011 uprising, they do not satisfactorily explain the differences in the
development of uprisings in these countries. In some cases, incumbent regimes were
replaced without a major clash. In other cases, peaceful demonstration developed into a
bloody civil conflict. Why do we observe such differences? Based on the three-factor
framework used to study the Iraq-Kurd conflict, I argue that the initial responses of the
governments made considerable difference, and considering regional and international
aspects in security decision-making of each regime can provide another insight into the
event.
Among the countries that have experienced the Arab Spring, I chose the cases of
Egypt and Libya. The two countries share some commonalities. Both countries were
regarded as enduring authoritarian regimes, each with it’s a leader had held power for
decades. The movements in Egypt and Libya were so large that thousands of people
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participated in the protests once they occurred. However, in Egypt, although protestors
and the security forces clashed in the beginning of the uprising, the Egyptian government
did not respond with heavy-handed repression. Rather, the Mubarak regime made
concessions several times to ease the anger of demonstrators in the street. After eighteen
days, Mubarak and the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) stepped down when the
vice-president, Omar Suleiman, announced the resignation of Mubarak as president on
February 11. By contrast, the Gaddafi regime almost immediately used force to repress
protesters. Within a week, Gaddafi’s security forces had killed at least 1,000 unarmed
protestors (Lynch 2011, 112). The uprising soon evolved into a full-scale conflict, which
last until October of that year when Gaddafi was killed in his hometown. As
demonstrated in these two cases, difference in the governments’ response to protest
brought about different consequences. That is, the level of violence by the incumbent
regime made a key difference between Egypt and Libya.76 Why did Mubarak and
Gaddafi make different choices? Applying a theoretical framework of security decisionmaking, I analyze and compare the domestic, regional, and international dimensions of
Egypt and Libya, and how differences in the three aspects may have influenced the
regimes’ choice in the face of the 2011 uprising.
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6.1 DOMESTIC DIMENSION
6.1.1 Egypt
Egypt was considered as one of the most enduring authoritarian states in the
world (Kassem 2004). President Hosni Mubarak was in power for thirty years beginning
in 1981, establishing an exceptionally strong model of presidential government
(Champman 1983). Mubarak had had the longest tenure of power among the three
Egyptian rulers since the 1952 coup. State power was concentrated in the hands of
President Mubarak, and the ruling party, the National Democratic Party (NDP), occupied
more than ninety percent of seats in the assembly. Accordingly, it was a shock when he
stepped down so quickly in the face of civilian protest.
On the surface, the domestic political circumstance of Mubarak’s Egypt looks
similar to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya in which a strong man
had governed the state for decades. Yet when one takes a closer view, Egyptian domestic
politics and the power status of Mubarak’s regime were far less stable than Iraq under
Hussein and Libya under Gaddafi.
Although Mubarak inherited power from two strong leaders, Nasser and Sadat,
his power status was not as strong as his predecessors. One of the reasons was the nature
of political elites. Unlike Saddam Hussein as well as Nasser and Sadat, Mubarak did not
structure a client group. As described in the previous chapter, Saddam Hussein
established a strong connection with his advisors based on kinship. Nasser and Sadat
organized the clusters of presidential clients that were assigned social, economic, and
political responsibilities (Springborg 1989). Hussein, Nasser and Sadat maintained a
close but subordinate relationship with his supporting elites by using both punishment
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and reward. Also, the inner core of elites under the three leaders was homogeneous in
composition and the relationship with their leader was intimate. On the other hand,
Mubarak relied more on the standard bureaucratic change of command. The failure of
establishing a strong patronage relationship with the core political elites resulted in the
decline of presidential power (Springborg 1989, 32).
Another factor that weakened Mubarak’s power was his attempt to turn over
presidency to his son, Gamal Mubarak. Since the early 2000s, Mubarak had paved way
for Gamal Mubarak to succeed his father as president. He appointed Gamal Mubarak as
the general secretariat of the NDP in February 2000. At the NDP internal congress held
on September 2002 under the slogan of “A New Way of Thinking,” Gamal created the
Policies Secretariat (Lesch 2011). The Policies Secretariat was a 123-member core group
of economic and academic elites who were close to Gamal but had no background in
politics (El-Ghobashy 2003). Gamal was promoted to head the Policies Secretariat at the
congress. The role of the Policies Secretariat was to transform the NDP into a party that
is managed by a new generation of technocrats. However, rather than making an effort
for a genuine transformation of the NDP, the Policies Secretariat was used as a vehicle
for succession (Langohr 2000; Arafat 2009). When the NDP performed poorly in the
2000 Parliament election, Gamal removed members of the old-conservative faction in the
NDP and the cabinet, and replaced them with his associates (Arafat 2009).
The opposition to Gamal’s succession of his father had been growing both inside
and outside the NDP.77 The old-conservative faction did not welcome Gamal’s semi-
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liberalized neoconservative faction and opposed Gamal’s campaign to bring new and
young figures into the ruling party (Arafat 2009). More importantly, the Egyptian public
did not support Gamal either. Along with economic and political depression and adverse
public sentiment toward the Egyptian stance on the Iraq War in 2003, Gamal’s rapid
political promotion produced public grievances against Mubarak’s regime from the
beginning. Many scholars have pointed out that the widespread fears that Gamal was the
appointed successor were one of the motives behind the Egyptian uprising in 2011.
Gamal did not gain trust from military generals either for several reasons. First of
all, unlike other Egyptian leaders since the 1952 coup, Gamal did not have a military
background. More importantly, there had been tension between the interests of the
military that had controlled many parts of Egyptian industry and the advocates around
Gamal who benefited from economic reform (Gelvin 2015, 69-70). Thus, Gamal and his
factions’ orientation toward market reform and the privatization of controlled commercial
enterprises was not acceptable to the military officers (Rutherford 2013). Under this
situation, the Egyptian military’s loyalty to the President faded. When the Arab Spring
spread throughout Egypt, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces decided not to fire
on demonstrators, emphasizing that their loyalty was to the nation, not to the president
(Lesch 2012, 39). Withdrawing their loyalty, the military played a critical role in ousting
Mubarak in 2012.
Internal Islamist opposition groups were another key factor that threatened
Mubarak’s regime. The Islamist movement had reached its peak in the early 1990s
(Houdaiby 2012, 135). About eighty-six percent of the casualties resulting from civil
strife since 1953 and up to 1993 occurred during the Mubarak era (Cassandra 1995, 19).
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This striking figure shows the relative weakness of Mubarak’s regime compared to the
two previous regimes.
Egypt’s Islamic movement was diverse and complex (Fandy 1994, 607). Amongst
Islamist groups, the Muslim Brotherhood is perhaps the most well known. Established in
1928, Muslim Brotherhood is the Egypt’s largest opposition group and the world's oldest
Islamist group (Houdaiby 2012, 126). Although some factions in the Muslim
Brotherhood have become radicalized, it renounced violence several times, and in 1987,
the Mubarak regime gave permission to form a political party and legally participate in
national politics (Gelvin 2015). However, as public support for the Muslim Brotherhood
rose rapidly, Mubarak and the NDP repressed the Muslim Brotherhood by arresting its
members and obstructing election of its candidates through electoral fraud in the
parliamentary elections.
While the Muslim Brotherhood was more a political party than an extremist
movement that played as the opposition party in political affairs, militant Islamists, such
the Islamic Jihad, Jamaat Islamiya (Islamic Group), and Vanguards of Conquest,
constitute terrorist attacks and insurgency against Mubarak regime (Cordesman 2006).
Their activities were a sporadic and limited terrorist campaign in the beginning, but it
evolved into a widespread and low-level insurgency. As the lower classes continued to
join, and the movements reflected their interest accordingly, the Islamist movement has
further radicalized and intensified. These groups are not only capable of intermittent acts
of violence, but also constituting an insurgency against the government (Cassandra 1995,
20-21).
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In sum, although Mubarak’s regime was widely considered an authoritarian
regime, he and his regime did not enjoy absolute power to the extent found with Hussein
or Gaddafi. Mubarak did not have a strong client group based on kinship or patronage.
His ambition to turn over the presidency to his son was facing opposition from all sectors
of the country including the NDP and the military. Islamist opposition groups were still
attempting to destabilize the regime. Under these circumstances, it can be argued that
President Mubarak’s relatively weak power status and unstable domestic affairs (due to
strong oppositionists at the time of the 2011 uprising) prevented an arbitrary decision to
use heavy repression in dealing with protestors. This is one of the reasons why he was
forced to make concessions, and finally resigned his presidency only eighteen days after
the uprising began.
6.1.2. Libya
Compared to Mubarak of Egypt, Muammar Gaddafi enjoyed absolute power as
leader of the country.78 Gaddafi came to power through a military coup on September 1,
1969. He and the members of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), the
leadership of the 1969 coup, abolished the short-lived Libyan monarchy and established
the new authority that advocated direct democracy, pan-Arabism, and anti-imperialism.
The Gaddafi regime’s domestic and foreign policies were made and implemented on the
basis of these ideologies. Ironically however, Gaddafi’s advocacy of direct democracy
contributed to the establishment of his absolute power status in Libya.
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The unique Libyan political system is based on Jamahiriya, which means, “rule by
the masses” or “state of the masses.” It is a system of direct popular democracy that was
drawn from Gaddafi’s “Third Universal Theory,” which advocates a decentralized and
participatory government. The formal system of Libyan democracy is based on three
foundations: the Basic People’s Congresses, the Peoples’ Committees, and the
Professional Organizations (Mattes 2008, 58-9). The Basic People’s Congresses are local
legislative organs of Libya. All Libyan people are eligible to participate. Members of the
People’s Committees, which are the local level of executive organs, are elected at the
Basic People’s Congress. Another organization that composes the Libyan democracy is
the Professional Organization. The employed were requested to join the Professional
Organization and were encouraged to express their opinions on the state’s national and
foreign developments. These are fundamental organizations of direct democracy of
Libya. The representatives of the national legislative body, the General People’s
Congress, are nominated by these three organizations. The General People’s Congress
nominates the members of the national level of the executive body, the General People’s
Committee. Although this system was modified in 1998 and resulted in the creation of
twenty-six regional units positioned between the basic and national levels, the basic
system has not been changed since the Declaration of Authority of the People of March
1977 (Mattes 2008; Blanchard and Zanotti, 2011).
Because it is based on a theory of a direct rule by all Libyan people, the
Jamahiriya system dismisses the need of representative institution and the role of political
parties in politics. It requires all Libyans to participate in the political decision making
process (Joffé and Paloetti 2010). Indirect democracy is unjust under this system. It
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rejects party pluralism and parties were considered as a threat to unity of Libya because
they pursue group interests only. Accordingly, all political parties were banned in 1972.
For the same reason, popular organizations, associations and unions, and active civil
society groups were prohibited and very few associations received permissions to form
and act (Mattes 2008). This is why there were no opposition political parties and unions
by the time of the 2011 uprising (Gelvin 2015, 90).
The Jamahiriya system was a utopian ideal. In reality, direct democracy did not
work. The state’s revolutionary sector was the real ruling body of the Libyan political
system. The revolutionary sector consisted of Gaddafi and the Revolutionary
Committees. Members of the Revolutionary Committees were involved in every state’s
institutions and no action could be taken without their permission. More importantly,
however, it was Gaddafi who made important internal and external policy decisions in
Libya. Personal access to the leader, such as family links and patron-client relationships,
were most important in influencing and participating in policy formulation. This
extremely personalized process was Libya’s striking feature of policy decision-making
process in both domestic and foreign politics (Joffé and Paloetti 2010).
This feature is also highly related to what Mattes (2008) called the “retribalization” of Libya. Mattes defines the terms as “the intensified reversion to members
of one’s own tribe in order to shore-up the regime” (Mattes 2008, 98). As in many
Middle Eastern and African countries, tribes have huge influence on Libyan society.
Emphasizing the welfare of the whole of Libya and unity of Libyan society, Gaddafi and
his revolutionary government opposed tribalism and family influence in politics. Yet,
Gaddafi himself had relied on his family, members of his tribe, and even members of
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allied tribes by appointing his own kinsmen to important positions. Re-tribalization was
manifested especially in security agencies. Members of Gaddafi’s extended family and
close associates who filled positions in security agencies closely monitored anti-Gaddafi
activities and punish opponents (Gelvin 2015).
In conclusion, unlike Egypt, Gaddafi enjoyed a high level of absolute power that
led to stability in domestic politics. He developed a unique direct participatory
democracy based on his Third Universal Theory. Yet his version of direct democracy did
not work in the real world and rather it resulted in an extremely strong authoritarian
regime. Any active political parties and social organizations could not emerge under this
system, which can be latent opposition groups. The absence of opposition forces made it
possible for the regime to use arbitrary power in the country’s policy making. Besides, as
Saddam Hussein did during his rule, Gaddafi established a strong supporting group by
appointing family members and relatives, and members of his tribes and allied tribes to
key positions. The absence of opposition groups, the concentration of decision-making
power to the president, and strong supporting group based on kinship brought about the
differences between Egypt and Libya. Libyan domestic politics and Gaddafi’s power
status were much more stable than Egypt and Mubarak. This is one possible explanation
how Gaddafi’s regime almost immediately opened fire against protestors.
6.2 REGIONAL DIMENSION
6.2.1 Egypt
Israel has been a traditional rival of Egypt. The two countries confronted each
other in all of the major Arab-Israeli conflicts in the 1900s, and Egypt always played a
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major role in every Arab-Israeli conflict. Military confrontation between the two ended in
the 1970s with the United States' involvement in Egyptian politics after the 1973 October
war. In fact, both the United States and Egypt found each other beneficial. The United
States was seeking more allied states in the Middle East to control the expansion of the
Soviet’s influence in the region. The Sadat regime perceived that only the United States
could contain Israel in the long run (Chapman 1983, 212). After the two disengagement
agreements in 1974 and 1975, Egypt and Israel signed the Camp David Accords in 1979
under the United States’ mediation. This was the first peace agreement with Israel in the
Arab world.
Maintaining peace with Israel has been a major security problem of Egypt.
Unexpected political crises or strategic shifts could make Israel a threat to Egypt
(Cordesman 206, 200). Moreover, as one of the only countries that have made a peace
agreement with Israel in the region, Egypt has often been in a difficult place whenever
the Arab-Israeli relationship becomes chilled.79 Protracted conflicts between Israel and
the Palestinians have been a politically as well as emotionally sensitive issue in Egyptian
politics. The Egyptian mass’ sympathy for the Palestinians clashed with the Mubarak
regime’s firm stand on maintaining peace with Israel. It threatened the legitimacy of the
Mubarak regime.
Despite the ongoing rivalry between Egypt and Israel, it is hard to expect the two
countries to engage in military confrontation. The probability is constrained significantly
by the United States, which wants peace in the region. As long as the two countries
receive political, economic, and military aid from the United States, both countries would
not attempt to destabilize each other’s internal affairs. In addition, for Egypt, economic
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development was a top priority. Thus they had sought a way out of the Israeli war trap
(Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 152).
In fact, it was the desire for Israel to maintain the status quo with its relationship
with Egypt. Mubarak’s regime was one of the few governments that were not hostile to
Israel. Any changes in Egypt were more likely to negatively affect the relationship with
Israel. The Egyptian uprising became a serious concern for Israel since there was a high
probability that Islamic groups would come to power. Islamic radicalism has been
spreading in many parts of the region, including Egypt. For Israel, it can cause a serious
security problem because a new radical Islamic regime could seek to renegotiate the 1979
peace treaty.80
Since the uprising occurred in Egypt, Israel has expressed its concern about the
possibility of an emerging radical Islamist government in Egypt. At the weekly Cabinet
meeting on 30 January 2011, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu emphasized that the
maintenance of the current relationship with Egypt is crucial for Israel’s security:
“We are anxiously monitoring what is happening in Egypt and (elsewhere) in our
region…Our efforts are designed to continue and maintain stability and security
in our region…I remind you that the peace between Israel and Egypt has endured
for over three decades and our goal is to ensure that these relations continue.”81

In talks with diplomatic officials on 2 February 2011, the Prime Minister mentioned
again Israel’s interest in maintaining peace with Egypt.82 Therefore, in his remarks at the
Knesset on 2 February 2011, he condemned the Western countries’ support of the
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Egyptian movement, arguing that it would bring to power extreme Islamist elements that
abuse the rules of democracy and impose anti-democratic regimes in the region.83 More
seriously, a successful transformation of Egypt to the Islamic state may give hope to
other Islamic groups. Eli Shaked, a former Israeli ambassador to Egypt, said “It is
expected that the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist parties will dominate the
government, and we are concerned that their success will encourage other Islamic radical
parties in the Middle East to act more openly to achieve their goals.”84
Since it is not in Israel’s interest to see the triumph of anti-governmental
protesters, Mubarak’s regime would not expect Israel to intervene in the 2011 event in
Egypt to destabilize the regime’s status in domestic and regional politics. This can be one
of the possible reasons why the Egyptian regime did not react violently to protesters.
6.2.2 Libya
Libya has had rival relationships with several countries in the region. It had
military conflicts with Chad over the Aouzou Strip, a territory in northern Chad with
uranium deposits (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 237). During Sadat’s years in Egypt, the
Gaddafi regime competed with Egypt for regional power. Most recently, Libya has
interfered in the Sudanese Darfur problem, supporting the Darfur rebel movements that
aim at replacing the incumbent regime in Sudan. In this section, I focus on the rivalry
between Libya and Sudan because it is an ongoing relationship that led Sudan to involve
itself in the 2011 conflict in Libya.
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Libya’s relationship with Sudan has been frequently antagonistic. The relationship
between the two states resembles the one between Iraq and Iran in that they used a policy
of intervention in internal affairs to destabilize the other country. Like Iraq and Iran,
Libya and Sudan often attempted to destabilize the other’s domestic politics by
supporting oppositionist groups. Most notably, Libya supported the Darfur rebel
movements in Sudan, providing military and financial aid. The largest group among the
Darfur rebels is the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) that have been pursuing armed
struggle to change the al-Bashir regime since its establishment in 2003. The Gaddafi
regime was a main external supporter of the JEM. According to officials of Sudan,
Gaddafi armed the JEM with recoilless rifles and anti-aircraft guns, and provided
vehicles and fuel.
According to Ahmed (2013), one of the possible motives behind Gaddafi’s
intervention in Sudanese internal affairs was that he feared stability in northern Sudan
would result in an increase in Sudan’s influence in Libya and the North Africa region.
With its abundant oil and domestic stabilization of the country, he might have thought
that there was a high possibility that Sudan would attempt to destabilize his regime. In
addition, it would weaken Libya’s regional status as a leading country in the region.
Witnessing the two leaders in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011, it was not impossible
for Sudan to imagine the fall of Gaddafi. Gaddafi may have recognized that it must have
been a chance for Sudan to intervene to remove Gaddafi’s regime that had been a great
supporter of JEM. It turned out Gaddafi’s concern became realized. When the United
Nations Security Council approved Resolution 1970 (2011) on 26 February 2011, Sudan
joined a multinational coalition led by NATO. President al-Bashir said the forces, which
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entered Tripoli, were all Sudanese. In his remarks that were broadcasted live on state
television on 26 October 2011, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir said, “our God high
and exalted, from above the seven skies, gave us the opportunity to reciprocate the
visit.”85 What he meant was that Sudan armed Libyan rebels during the Libyan civil
conflict in 2011 in response to Gaddafi’s support for Sudanese rebels that attacked
Khartoum in 2008 using Libyan arms and money. The head of Libya’s interim ruling
council also confirmed Sudanese involvement. On his first official visit to Sudan on 25
November, 2011, Mustafa Abdel Jalil, a chairman of the Libyan National Transitional
Council, said Sudan sent weapons and ammunition through Egypt to support Libyan
rebels, helping them to oust Gaddafi and take control of the country. At a conference of
Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party, he said “if not for Sudanese military assistance,
it would not have been possible to liberate Kufra,” which is a district in southeast
Libya.86
In sum, the fact that Libya and Sudan were in an active rivalry relationship at the
time of the 2011 uprising is one of the differences between Egypt and Libya. Considering
a high possibility of external intervention from the neighboring rival, military operation
against the uprising may have been better option for Gaddafi.
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6.3 INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION
6.3.1 Egypt
Since 1979, Egypt has been the second largest recipient of US foreign assistance
(Sharp 2011, 17) , and the only Arab country bordering Israel that has been able to
compete in arms imports during the 1990s (Cordesman 2004, 173). The influx of US aid
into Egypt occurred in return for the 1979 Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt. Since
then, Egypt’s dependence on US aid has been growing heavily. When the uprising broke
out in Egypt, the Obama administration publicly pressured Mubarak to resign from the
presidency. The Mubarak regime’s excessive dependence on US aid may have prevented
Mubarak from repressing the protestors rigorously.
The United States has given Egypt about $71.6 billion in bilateral military and
economic aid between 1948 and 2011.87 Also, the United States is Egypt’s largest
bilateral trading partner, and the second-largest foreign investor in Egypt (Sharp 2011,
23). The two countries are engaged in bilateral science, business, and technological
cooperation as well. In December 2011, the Obama administration launched the
President’s Global Innovation through Science and Technology (GIST) program in
Egypt. Egypt has been participating in the Global Entrepreneurship Program (GEP),
which is designed to assist entrepreneurs in Muslim communities (Sharp 2011, 21). In
addition, the United States has provided funds for democracy promotion in Egypt,
supporting activities of Egyptian and international NGOs.

87

Brad Plumer, “The U.S. gives Egypt $1.5 billion a year in aid. Here’s what it does,” The
Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/07/09/the-u-s-givesegypt-1-5-billion-a-year-in-aid-heres-what-it-does/ (accessed October 11, 2016).

113

At the initial stage of the uprising, the Obama administration supported the
Mubarak regime. On January 18, 2011, the White House released a statement that
President Obama spoke with President Mubarak on the Arab issues including the Arab
uprising in Tunisia, and discussed ways to end violence and the establishment of an
interim government for holding free and fair elections. This conversation occurred only a
week before the outbreak of the Egyptian uprising. Soon after, however, the Obama
administration changed its stance and strongly demanded Mubarak to resign (Nepstad
2013, 342-343). On February 1, 2011, President Obama made it clear that a transition
must be “meaningful,” which meant Mubarak’s immediate resignation. He also
mentioned that a new government should be installed through free and fair elections:
We have spoken out on behalf of the need for change. After his speech tonight, I
spoke directly to President Mubarak…What is clear – and what I indicated tonight
to President Mubarak – is my belief that an orderly transition must be meaningful,
it must be peaceful, and it must begin now. Furthermore, the process must include
a broad spectrum of Egyptian voices and opposition parties. It should be lead to
elections that are free and fair. And it should result in a government that’s not
only grounded in democratic principles, but is also responsive to the aspirations of
the Egyptian people.88
President Obama also urged the Egyptian military to allow peaceful protests. As
some scholars argue, the US stand on the Egyptian uprising may have driven the
Egyptian military’s decision in the uprising because the military would want to maintain
its biggest supplier of arms and military aids (Nepstad 2013). As we witnessed, the
Egyptian military’s decision of siding with the protestors was key for the Egypt’s
bloodless democratic transition in 2011.
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The Egyptian military leadership was the largest beneficiary of US aid toward
Egypt. As Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1 show, a significant amount of US aid is allocated for
military purposes. One third of Egypt’s military budget is made up by US aid. On
average, the United States has provided $1.3 billion of military aid per year since 1987
plus much of the military equipment to Egypt. It covers almost 80 percent of the Egyptian
Defense Ministry’s weapons procurement costs.89 In addition, Egypt is one of the
countries that receive Excess Defense Articles (EDA) administrated by the Defense
Security Cooperation Agency and the Department of Defense of the United States.90
EDA provides partner state defense equipment at a reduced price or grant for the
modernization of partner forces.91 It has assisted Egypt in replacing Egypt’s Soviet
weaponry with US equipment. Another benefit that Egyptian military officers have
received from the alliance with the United States is they are invited to the International
Military and Education Training (IMET) program at a reduced rate (Sharp 2011).
As the largest beneficiary from the United States-Egyptian alliance, the Egyptian
military had a great deal to lose if it turned against the United States. This may have led
them to defect from Mubarak and his regime and accommodate the protestors (and thus
side with the United States). Without support from the military, suppression by force was
not an option that was available to Mubarak in the face of uprising.
In conclusion, since the 1979 peace treaty with Israel, the United States has
provided a huge amount of US assistance to Egypt. When the Arab uprising spilt over
into Egypt, the Obama administration publicly urged President Mubarak to resign without
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Table 6.1 US Foreign Assistance to Egypt, 1948 – 2013 ($ in millions)

FY1948-FY1997
FY1998
FY1999
FY2000
FY2001
FY2002
FY2003
FY2004
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
F20Y08
FY2009
FY2010
FY2011
FY2012
FY2013
Total

Economic
$23,288.6
$815.0
$775.0
$727.0
$695.0
$655.0
$911.0
$571.6
$530.7
$490.0
$450.0
$411.6
$250.0
$250.0
$249.5
$250.0
$241.0
$31,320.3

Military
$22.353.5
$1,300.0
$1,300.0
$1,300.0
$1,300.0
$1,300.0
$1,300.0
$1,292.3
$1,289.6
$1,287.0
$1,300.0
$1,289.4
$1,300.0
$1,300.0
$1,297.4
$1,300.0
$1,234.3
$41,809.2

IMET
$27.3
$1.0
$1.0
$1.0
$1.0
$1.0
$1.2
$1.4
$1.2
$1.2
$1.3
$1.2
$1.3
$1.9
$1.4
$1.4
$1.7
$44.5

Total
$45,669.40
$2,116.0
$2,076.0
$2,028.3
$1,996.0
$1,956.0
$2,212.2
$1,865.3
$1,821.5
$1,778.2
$1,751.3
$1,702.2
$1,551.3
$1,551.9
$1,548.3
$1,551.4
$1,477.0
$73.17.0

Source: Congressional Research Service Report (Sharp 2016)
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any violence against protesters. As one of the largest recipients of US aid, it can easily be
imagined that the Mubarak regime could not resist pressure from its patron state. Also,
when the Egyptian military that has benefited the most from US aid turned against the
regime and stood with protesters, Mubarak lost the means with which to repress the
uprising. This explains why Mubarak did not, or could not, respond to the uprising with
heavy arms and the uprising did not develop into severe civil conflict in Egypt.
6.3.2 Libya
There was an obvious contrast between Egypt and Libya in terms of international
relations. As discussed earlier, Egypt heavily relied on foreign aid from the United States.
Notably, Egypt was dependent on the United States for military assistance and other
aspects of strategic cooperation (Zunes 2011).92 Egyptian elites, especially the military
who played a major role in the overthrow of Mubarak’s regime, did not want to lose their
connection with the United States, and therefore, were reluctant to go against the United
States’ stand. On the other hand, Libya has not relied on any external powers. Except for
a short period of time when Libya approached the Soviet Union for strategic reasons in
the 1980s, Libya did not build any “patron-client” relationships with other countries. In
fact, Libya had been internationally isolated for decades since the accusation of
sponsoring terrorism and planting weapons of mass destruction. The country reappeared
in the international community in 2003 when it normalized its diplomatic relationship
with the Western countries.
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In the early stage of statehood, Libya was one of the Pro-Western countries
among Middle Eastern and North African countries. King Idris who became the head of
the federal monarchy of Libya in 1951 maintained close ties with the Western powers
rather than joining anti-Western and pan-Arabism in the 1950s (Alterman 2006). A
friendly relationship with the West did not last long, however. After the military coup led
by Colonel Gaddafi, who proclaimed anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, the
relationship between Libya and the West, especially the United States, became strained.
Libya declared neutrality in the superpower competition, condemning the United States
as the leader of Western imperialism and capitalism (Metz 1987).
In 1970, as soon as he seized power, Gaddafi severed diplomatic relations with
the West, including the United States by terminating the presence of foreign troops and
foreign governments. The US Wheelus Air Force Base, which was built by the Italian
airforce and captured by the British during World War II, near Tripoli was closed. It had
been used by the US military since 1943.93 Since it was the most overt symbol of the
Western aggressive imperialist legacy, the Gaddafi regime’s announcement of evacuating
the Wheelus Air Force Base was a clear indication of the hostile posture of the new
Libyan leader to the West (Ronen 2008, 10).
The relationship between the United States and Libya worsened during the late
1970s and 1980s. In 1979, the United States designated Libya a sponsor of terrorism. The
two countries kept attacking each other’s military personnel, aircrafts, and naval ships. In
1981, the President Ronald Reagan began taking actions against Libya, ordering the close
of Libyan governmental offices and the freeze of Libyan assets in the United State as a
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part of economic sanctions against Libya (Metz 1987). The tensions between the two
peaked in 1986 when a Libyan terrorist group bombed a nightclub in West Berlin, which
was frequented by United States service personnel.94 Two people were killed and more
than 200 people were injured. In response, President Reagan ordered attacks on Libyan
military bases and residential areas of Tripoli and Benghazi. Gaddafi escaped injury, but
dozens of people were killed, including Gaddafi’s adopted daughter. In 1988, Libya was
suspected of bombing Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie in Scotland, killing 270 people
including 180 US nationals. A series of bombings and terrorist attacks continued into the
1980s, and Libya’s diplomatic relations with the United States was further damaged.
Only modest commercial and economic ties maintained. The United States imposed more
economic sanctions on Libya. On January 8 1986, the Reagan government froze the
Libyan government’s assets in US banks, including deposits held in foreign branches of
the banks.95 In addition to this, the administration ordered a total trade embargo with
Libya that required all Americans living in Libya to leave the country.
Unlike Egypt, the Libyan leader did not succumb to US pressure. In his interview
at the Babl el-Azzazir military barracks in Tripoli with the Western reporters in January
1986, Gaddafi criticized the US sanctions as “crazy and face-saving measures,” and the
decision was a “silly and emotional” response that would have no adverse effect on
Libya. He also warned, “with regard to the American threat, there will be more
cooperation between Libya and the Soviet Union.” Using Cuba as an example, he added
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that his country could be transformed into a communist state if the United States
continued to pose a threat.96
In 1991, the Unite States and Britain officially announced that Libya was
responsible for the explosion of Pan Am Flight 103. It was followed by a series of UNimposed sanctions against Libya in 1992 and 1993. UN Security Council Resolution 748
on 31 March 1992 banned air travel and the supply of any aircraft to Libya, prohibited
arms sales and technical advice or assistance to the country, and reduced the number and
the level of the staff at Libyan diplomatic missions and consular posts. UN Security
Council Resolution 883 on 11 November 1993 froze Libya’s overseas funds and financial
resources, and banned sales or supplies of oil and oil projects. Together with UNimposed sanctions, US Congress passed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) in
1996.97 The bill was originally introduced to impose sanctions on Iran in 1995 in
response to Iran’s nuclear program and its support to terrorist organizations (Katzman
2006).98 An amendment was added to the bill, which applied all the provisions of the bill
to Libya. The sanctions banned investments in oil development and natural resources in
Libya and the export of weapons or technology to Libya. The ILSA was renewed in 2001
for another five years. In sum, hostility between the two countries continued in the 1980s
and it brought about a series of economic sanctions from the US-led international
community as well as the United States’ government against Libya.
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Diplomatic relationships between the two countries were slowly restored in 2003
when Libya renounced terrorism and expressed its intention to dismantle its weapons of
mass destruction program. The Gaddafi regime accepted responsibility for the 1988
Lockerbie bombing of the Pan Am flight and agreed to pay compensation to the victims’
families. Motives behind the regime’s shift include both domestic and international
factors. Domestically, Gaddafi needed foreign investments for its oil-based economy
(Ronen 2008, 66). The rents of Libya’s total natural resources (percent of GDP) dropped
to 32.9 percent in 2000 and 30.3 percent in 2001.99 In rential states like Libya, a heavy
portion of state income is derived from natural resources. Decrease in total natural
resources rent, therefore, would have brought about economic hardship to the country. In
addition, since the ILSA prohibited US companies to invest in the Libyan oil industry,
technological development was halted. The one way to break through the situation was to
normalize the relationship with the United States so that sanctions could be lifted.
International events also affected changes in Gaddafi’s stance. Since the collapse
of the Soviet Union, the world system was restructured around the United States. The
Middle East was heavily influenced by the reshuffle in the world order since the region
was the locus of intense U.S.-Soviet competition. Middle Eastern countries were divided
into two groups under the two super powers: the pro-Soviet and the pro-United States.
Gaddafi had advocated anti-imperialism and neutralism in his early days in power, but his
regime became close to the Soviet Union during the 1970s and he received political and
military support from the Soviet. The regime’s hostility toward the United States and its
antagonistic allies – Egypt and Sudan – made Libya more dependent on the Soviet Union
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(Ronen 2008). The collapse of the Soviet Union brought about the diplomatic isolation of
Gaddafi’s regime. It required Gaddafi to find a way to survive in a changed international
circumstance, and he chose to normalize his relationship with the West. Another key
event that affected Gaddafi regime’s shift was the 2003 Iraq War. The world witnessed
how Saddam Hussein’s regime was toppled by the Western powers. Since the United
States had the rationale to oust Gaddafi’s regime as it had for Iraq, Gaddafi would have
feared that same thing could happen to his regime. Renouncing terrorism and disclosing
and dismantling weapons of mass destruction program was only way to remove the
United States’ rationale for military actions against Libya. In response, the United States
resumed full diplomatic relations with Libya on May 31, 2006.100
Dynamics in the diplomatic history between the United States and Libya shows
how Gaddafi’s regime strategically behaved for its survival in an ever-changing
international environment. Although sanctions imposed by the United Nations and the
United States brought Libya economic hardship for some time and led Gaddafi’s regime
to shift its stance toward the West, it does not mean that Libya was economically,
militarily, or politically dependent on the United States as Egypt. At the time of the 2011
uprising, Libya and the United States were more or less equal in their bilateral
relationship. On 20 May 2010, the two countries signed a Trade and Investment
Framework Agreement at Tripoli. Expanding commercial relations with Libya was
beneficial not only to Libya but also to the United States due to Libya’s abundant oil and
gas reserves. US oil companies welcomed this step. The United States gained strategic
benefits as well. A successful transformation of Libya from an adversary state to a
partner would have been a useful precedent in the international community (Mack
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2011)101. As Gaddafi learnt from the fall of Saddam Hussein, the United States can
expect that leaders in remaining hostile states, such as Kim Jong Un of North Korea, have
lessons from the Libyan case.
In conclusion, Gaddafi’s Libya and Mubarak’s Egypt were situated in different
diplomatic circumstances. Economic and political support from the United States had
been essential to Egypt. Thus, when the Obama administration officially urged not to
suppress the 2011 movement, it would not have been easy for Mubarak and his regime to
challenge the Unites States. On the other hand, bilateral relations between Libya and the
United States were on equal terms. A “patron-client relationship” was not established
between the two, and therefore, Gaddafi and Libyan elites would not need to consider the
United States’ standpoint on an internal issue. As soon as the uprising occurred, Gaddafi
moved quickly and suppressed the rebel side. The demonstration escalated into a fullscale war, which lasted for six months.
6.4 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I have analyzed the two Arab movements that occurred in Egypt
and Libya during the 2011 Arab Spring by applying the key findings delineated from the
Iraqi-Kurdish conflict cases. The analysis shows that a theory based on the Three
Dimensionality Model of state security – domestic, regional, and international
dimensions – can explain the differences between the Egypt uprising and the Libyan
armed conflict. In terms of the domestic dimension, there was a difference in the extent
of the ruling regime’s power and stability in domestic politics. Although both regimes
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were regarded as authoritarian regimes, Gaddafi enjoyed a higher level of absolute power
and stability in domestic politics than Mubarak’s regime. Regionally, although Egypt and
Israel have been traditional rivals of each other, there was a very low possibility that
Israel may intervene in the 2011 events in Egypt. In contrast, Libya and Sudan were in an
active rivalry relationship at the time of the 2011 uprising. In terms of the international
dimension, while Egypt was clearly in a “patron-client relationship” with the United
States, Libya’s relationship with the United States was on equal terms. I argued that these
differences led the two regimes to make different choices in the face of uprising, resulting
in contrasting outcomes.
Illuminating the Arab Spring in terms of the Three Dimensionality Model of state
security provides us another way of understanding the phenomenon. Since these events
occurred, scholars and policy makers have been trying to explain them in various ways.
However, most studies limit their scope of analysis to the domestic circumstances of the
country and only explain why people rebel against the government. By looking at both
the internal and external environments and their influence on the security policy decisions
of the regimes, this research contributes to a cumulation of understanding about the
development of internal violence. I will develop this discussion more fully in the
concluding chapter.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
7.1 FINDINGS
The primary objective of this research was to explore the dynamics in the
development of civil conflict. Specifically, I tried to explain the reasons for the
occurrence of full-scale domestic armed conflicts and the variation in the intensity of that
conflict. Given that a large portion of the previous studies in the field have taken the
rebel-centric and aggregate cross-country approaches, this research has focused on the
state side and how the internal-external environments within which the ruling regime is
situated affect its security decisions on rebellion. The main argument of this research is
that the occurrence of severe civil conflict depends on how ruling governments respond
to rebellion. In the face of rebellion, a ruling regime has to make a decision whether it
crushes the rebels or compromises with them based on the consideration of its internal
and external dimensions of state security.
In order to conduct a systematic analysis, I built a theoretical framework in
chapter three – the Three Dimensionality Model of state security. Based on Most and
Starr’s willingness and opportunity framework, I pointed out the importance of exploring
both capabilities and environmental factors in studying the governments’ decision in the
face of rebellion. Next, I explained the usefulness of the concept of security to shed light
on the phenomena of civil conflicts. I moved on to emphasize the importance of historical
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factors in creating opportunities for the occurrence of conflicts. Then I discussed the
Three Dimensionality Model of state security with its domestic, regional, and
international dimensions, and how these three dimensions influence the ruling regime’s
decision between compromise and repression. I argued that when the ruling regime
enjoys a strong power status in domestic politics, gets involved in intense rival
relationships with a neighboring state, and has patron-client relationships with a
superpower country, they are more likely to suppress a rebel group. Specifically, I first
argued that a high level of stability in domestic politics and regime’s power status tends
to lead the ruling regime to suppress rebellion rather than make a compromise. In terms
of a regional dimension, I insisted that governments are more likely to suppress the
insurgents when it finds that domestic instability invites the intervention from
neighboring rival states. Lastly, I emphasized the role of patron-client relationships
between the state and superpower. I argued that the high dependency on the superpower
increases the likelihood that the government follows the patron state’s stance on internal
affairs.
In chapter five, I analyzed the set of Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts by applying the
theory developed in the previous chapter. The comparative case analyses supported the
idea that the state’s security decisions made on the basis of its opportunity direct the
course of conflict development. Specifically, the cases showed that while Iraq’s colonial
experience and military capacity created “opportunity” for internal instability and the
occurrence of conflict after Iraq’s independence, it was the changes in domestic, regional,
and international security circumstances that brought about variations in conflict onset
and variation in the intensity of conflict. When domestic politics were stable and the Iraqi
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ruling regime enjoyed an absolute power status, the rival relationship with Iran was more
hostile, and the ruling regime relied less on superpowers, the regime did not
accommodate the Kurdish rebels and repressed them more severely, resulting in intense
conflicts.
In chapter six, I applied the key findings from the Iraqi-Kurdish cases to the 2011
Egyptian uprising and the 2011 Libyan civil conflict. I found that although both
Mubarak’s regime and Gaddafi’s regime were widely considered as strong and enduring
authoritarian regimes, they were situated in different internal-external circumstances at
the time of the Arab uprising. Gaddafi enjoyed a higher level of absolute power than
Mubarak who lost support from both the elites and Egyptian public. Regionally, Egypt’s
rival relationship with Israel was more or less stable and inactive whereas Libya was still
in an intense rivalry relationship with Sudan. Internationally, Egypt heavily relied on the
United States who was officially pressing Mubarak to resign and settle the protest
peacefully. In contrast, Libya did not engage in any clear patron-client relationships with
other countries. The chapter argued that these differences influenced the two regimes to
make different choices in handling the 2011 movements. While Mubarak made several
concessions and finally resigned, Gaddafi harshly repressed the protestors from the
beginning, which resulted in a full-scale conflict. Table 7.1 summarizes the findings
across the five cases for each aspect of the theoretical model of this research.
7.2 IMPLICATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS
Throughout this research, I took a systematic and empirical approach to
analyze the variations in onset and severity of civil conflict, conducting a set of
comparative case studies. The findings supported my arguments, reflecting the
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Table 7.1 Summary of Findings
Cases
Three Dimensions of State Security
Iraqi-Kurdish Domestic
Domestic politics was unstable and
Conflict
power status of the ruling regimes
1st Phase
was weak due to reoccurring
military coup d’état

Iranian aid to the Kurdish rebellion
was limited, and the intervention
from Iran was minimal
International Iraq’s political, economic, and
military dependency on the Soviet
Union was high; The Soviet Union
opposed military action against the
Kurds and supported Kurdish
autonomy
Iraqi-Kurdish Domestic
The mixture of consolidation of the
Conflict
Baath Party’s authority and the
nd
2 Phase
emergence of a strong leader,
Saddam Hussein

Outcomes
Confrontation often
ended with
stalemate or
compromise; Low
or intermediate level
of conflicts
persisted

Regional

Regional

The number of
casualties was much
higher than the first
phase in a short
period of time; The
regime quickly
defeated the Kurds

Iraqi-Iranian rivalry became
manifested; Iran evidently provided
military and financial aid to the
Kurds
International Iraq’s dependency on the Soviet
Union was reduced
Iraqi-Kurdish Domestic
Domestic politics was stable as
The most intense
Conflict
Saddam Hussein consolidated his
conflicts between
rd
3 Phase
power as a leader
Iraqi government
and the Kurds; The
Iraqi regime brutally
repressed the Kurds
Regional
Regional competition between Iraq
and Iran became intense after the
1979 Iranian Revolution; The IranIraq War was the climax of rivalry
between the two
International The influence of the Soviet Union
was rapidly reduced
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Egyptian
Uprising

Domestic

The power status of President
Mubarak was weak due to the
absence of supporting group, his
attempt to turn over presidency to
his son, and the existence of strong
oppositionists
Regional
The rival relationship between
Egypt and Israel was stable and
inactive; Both countries wanted to
maintain the status quo
International Egypt’s political, economic, and
military dependency on the U.S.
was extremely high; The U.S.
officially urged President Mubarak
to resign without any violence
Libyan
Domestic
Gaddafi enjoyed absolute power as
Civil Conflict
a leader

President Mubarak
made several
concessions, and
finally resigned

President Gaddafi
immediately took
military actions and
the demonstration
evolved into civil
conflict

Regional

Libya and Sudan were in an active
rivalry relationship at the time of
the 2011 uprising
International Libya did not rely on superpowers;
Bilateral relations between Libya
and the U.S. were on equal terms
explanatory utility of the Three Dimensionality Model of state security. By shedding light
on the role of governments and the factors that influence their security decisions
regarding internal opposition groups, this research fills a gap in the literature, which
mainly has taken a rebel-centric and aggregate cross-country approaches. Specifically,
the results demonstrated that it was the states’ response to rebellion that made a
difference in conflict occurrence and severity. The findings also suggest that explaining
conflict phenomena only by the countries’ aggregate attributes misses the influence of the
dynamics of internal and external political change on the states’ decision in the face of
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rebellion. In this sense, this research helps to provide a more comprehensive view of the
development of civil conflict and understanding the dynamics of such conflict.
In addition, this study attempted to reconcile theories of two sub-fields in the
discipline of political science, IR and CP. Although civil conflict studies have drawn the
attention of IR scholars for more than twenty years, there has been a lack of collaboration
with the field of CP, in which political violence has been one of the major sub-fields and
in which a number of insightful theories of civil violence have been developed. While
research in international relations has sought to develop general explanations for trends in
civil conflict worldwide through large-N empirical analyses, the CP literature has
provided a more in-depth understanding on the origins and processes of civil conflict in
specific countries based on case study research. Synthesizing the studies in the two subfields enabled me not only to develop the Three Dimensionality Model of state security
but also to contribute to the “integrative cumulation (Zinnes 1976a)” of our knowledge
on civil conflict (as cited in Most and Starr 1989, 1).
This study is also of value to policymakers in a sense that the findings provide
clues about bringing peace to countries that suffer from bloody civil conflicts. In
particular, I found that external pressure could effectively lead incumbent regimes to take
a more peaceful path in dealing with internal opposition. This implies that not only
superpowers but also the international community can affect decisions of the incumbent
regimes. Armed conflicts always involve human rights issues. For instance, a military
assault on civilians and displaced refugees are major issues in most internal conflicts. The
international community has made an effort to prevent the occurrence of such events. As
members of the global community, states cannot be free from the operations of
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international norms and pressure. Especially when a state receives aid from the
international community, it will be more difficult for it to escape from international
pressure. The internationalization of a state’s domestic conflict may be a way to solve the
problem more peacefully. The influence of the international community might be
relatively less powerful than the impact of a superpowers’ direct interference. Yet, it can
warn the state regarding inhumane actions against their populations and impose
limitations on the state’s violent behavior by regulating international aid.
7.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT
There are several directions for future study. One way to elaborate the theory
developed in this research is to develop it into a typological theory using the three
dimensions of state security and conflict. The logic behind typological theorizing is that
different combinations of variables are assumed to have effects on an outcome that vary
across types (Gerring 2007, 98). “Types” are specified conjunctions or configurations of
the variables (George and Bennett 2005, 235). For instance, I can start with classifying
different domestic, regional, and international dimensions according to the level of
political stability, hostility between rival states, and reliance on external support
respectively. Then, I would set out conjunctions based on the classification that lead to
the typology, and see how different types of state security situations are related to conflict
onset and development. This new information can be used to construct a large-N data set.
The second related endeavor is to conduct a large-N statistical analysis by
constructing a new data set or using existing data sets. Domestic instability could be
operationalized as the levels of legitimacy and state fragility, which allows me to use
existing data sets. Regional competition and intervention could be measured as the levels
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of rivalry relationships and foreign support flow to rebel groups.102 International
influence could be measured as the level of state reliance on foreign aid.
Third, I can develop the discussion on the influence of colonization further. To do
so, I can investigate the different colonial background conditions of the states in the case
studies, either to help with creating typology, or as a variable in designing a possible
large-N study.
Third, I can utilize a formal model. Formal modeling is particularly useful when
one studies political behavior and political processes. Therefore, constructing a formal
model to analyze a leaders’ decision between suppression and accommodation will
enhance the theory’s explanatory power further.
Fourth, although the main focus of the present research is the state government, I
can expand the scope of the research to the rebel side by examining the influence of
insurgent group’s goals on state decision. For instance, I can measure the goals of an
insurgent group as 1) removing incumbents; 2) creating an independent state; 3)
reforming the state, and then see how the incumbent regimes respond differently
depending on the rebel’s goals. In this way, I can construct a more comprehensive model
to explain a state’s decisions in the face of internal armed conflict.
Fifth, I can conduct additional case studies. One possible new case could be the
post-Gulf War Iraqi-Kurdish conflict. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the war with an
international coalition of forces changed Iraq’s internal and external political
environment completely. Strong criticism from Arab countries and international
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The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database contains information on all transfers of major
conventional weapons from 1950 to the most recent full calendar year. The database provides
information on arms transfers not only between countries but also between a country and a rebel
group.
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opposition to the invasion weakened not only the international status of Iraq but also
Saddam Hussein’s domestic power status. Under different environment, economic, and
political hardships, followed by the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein’s regime may have made
different policy decisions toward the Kurds. The Iraqi-Kurdish case studies could be redone to incorporate the Shi’i uprising in Iraq as well, either as separate case studies or as
additions to the existing ones. It is also possible to break down the Egyptian and Libyan
cases by different time periods. Conducting additional case studies can be a good way to
increase the validity and reliability of the theoretical argument of this research.
Lastly, I can apply the theory to the other Arab countries that have experienced
the Arab Spring, and see how well the theory explains the other cases. For instance, based
on the findings supporting the Three Dimensionality Model and stressing both
commonalities and differences, it might be useful to analyze the Syrian civil conflict. The
Arab Spring is an ongoing event and the results of uprising vary considerably. Diversity
in the course of conflict and the outcomes in each country allows me to examine the
usefulness of the model developed here and which dimension of state security is more
influential. In this way, I can make stronger analytic generalization for the theory behind
the Three Dimensionality Model of state security and armed conflict.
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